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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to decide the appeal of this matter pursuant to 
Article VIII, Section 3 of the Utah Constitution and Section 78-2-2(3)(j), Utah Code Ann. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court err in failing to follow controlling Utah law in this case when the 
court equitably excused strict compliance with the requirements of a lease renewal 
option? 
In reviewing the trial court's conclusions of law, the appellate court reviews for 
correctness and accords no deference. K.J. Scharfv. BMG Corporation, 700 P.2d 1068, 
1070 (Utah 1985). 
2. Did the trial court incorrectly apply language contained in Geisdorfv. Doughty, 972 
P.2d 67 (Utah 1998), in this case? 
The appropriate standard of review of this issue is a review for correctness. 
Anesthesiologists Associates of Ogden v. St Benedict's Hospital, 884 P.2d 1236, 1238 
(Utah 1994) (on legal questions, "we accord the conclusions of the court below no 
particular deference but review them for correctness.") Even in a case involving an 
equitable remedy, the appellate court reviews conclusions of law without deference to the 
trial court. Englertv. Zane, 848 P.2d 165 (Ut.App. 1993). 
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3. Did the trial court properly grant summary judgment in favor of defendant in this 
matter? 
Questions of law are reviewed for correctness without deference. Equitable Life 
and Casualty Insurance Company v. Ross, 849 P.2d 1187 (Ut.App. 1993) (cert, denied, 
860 P.2d 943 (1993)). 
Each of these issues arises directly out of the ruling of the trial court in its grant of 
partial summary judgment (the "Judgment") R.741-746, and is preserved for appeal on that 
basis. A copy of the judgment is attached in the Addendum as Exhibit 1. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules or regulations 
that are determinative of this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of Case. 
This is an appeal from a Partial Summary Judgment entered following the parties' 
cross-motions for summary judgment. The issues involve a renewal option for a 
commercial lease of real property located in Park City, Utah (the "Lease," a copy of which 
is attached as Exhibit A to the Complaint, R.OO 1-020, and a copy of which is provided in 
the Addendum as Exhibit 2). 
2 
Defendant/Appellee Outdoor Endeavors Unlimited dba White Pine Touring ("White 
Pine"), the tenant in this case, failed to provide written notice of its intent to renew the 
Lease within the time required by the option provision in the Lease. Plain tiff/Appellant 
Utah Coal and Lumber Restaurant, Inc. ("Utah Coal") filed an unlawful detainer action 
against White Pine. White Pine counterclaimed seeking a declaratory judgment that the 
failure to give timely notice should be equitably excused, based on White Fine's "honest 
and justifiable mistake," (relying on dicta language in Geisdorfv. Doughty, 972 P. 2d 67, 
71 (Utah 1998). The trial court denied Utah Coal's motion for summary judgment on its 
complaint, and granted White Pine's motion for partial summary judgment, ruling that 
White Pine was equitably excused from strictly complying with the Lease provision 
requiring timely exercise of the option to renew the Lease. A copy of the transcript of the 
hearing on cross-motions for summary judgment, R. 1071-1126, which was held on 
July 26, 1999, is included in the Addendum as Exhibit 3. 
2. Statement of Facts, 
(a) Events Preceding Litigation. 
Utah Coal, the owner of an historic commercial building in Park City, Utah, 
entered into the Lease with White Pine on May 16, 1993, pursuant to which Utah Coal 
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leased the building to White Pine R.001-014.1 As provided in the Lease, White Pine took 
the building in an "as is" condition and was responsible for the majority of the 
improvements that were necessary to change the building from a restaurant, its previous 
use, to a retail store. Lease 15, R.012. The Lease provided for an initial (primary) five-
year term, with the "Commencement Date" defined as "the earlier of the date occupancy 
is permitted by Park City or October 1, 1993." Lease p. 1, R.014. The Lease contained 
an option for three renewal terms of five years each, specifying that the option must "be 
exercised by Tenant [White Pine] providing Landlord [Utah Coal] with written notice 
thereof not more than one hundred twenty (120) nor less than sixty (60) days prior to 
expiration of the primary or any extended term." R.014. Paragraph 31 of the Lease stated 
that time is of the essence. R.005. 
Charlie and Kathy Sturgis, the owners of White Pine, a sporting goods store, had 
operated for the previous seven years at a nearby location on Main Street, Park City. 
R.600, DepositionofCharlesSturgis "CSDep." 11-12, R.574-575. White Pine opened 
*The numbering of the record starts with the last page of the first docketed pleading and 
goes straight through the court's file, "back to front," except for the Reporter's Transcripts of 
the hearing on cross-motions for summary judgment, held July 26, 1999 and the hearing on the 
Rule 54(b) certification held March 30, 2000. The transcripts are numbered front to back. 
Unfortunately, however, the index lists the wrong numbers for the transcripts. The transcript 
of the July 26, 1999 hearing on cross-motions for summary judgment is actually numbered 
R. 1071-1126. In all cases references to the record are made in ascending order for 
consistency, despite the "back to front" numbering. 
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for business in the Utah Coal building on August 26, 1993. Deposition of Kathy Sturgis, 
"KS Dep."10, R.173, and paid the full rent prescribed by the Lease effective as of that 
date. R.206, 204. The Certificate of Occupancy for the building is dated September 9, 
1993. R.210. 
The Lease prescribed an initial annual rent of $33,000 for the 4,712 sq. ft. building, 
subject to an adjustment to $50,500 (i.e., for less than $ll/sq. ft. annually), at the 
beginning of the third year of the primary term. Lease 11(a), R.013. Although Utah Coal 
initially viewed August 26, 1995 as the effective date for this increase, the parties 
ultimately agreed to use September 1, 1995. R.202. Upon the exercise of any of the 
renewal options, the Lease provided for a one-time rent increase at the beginning of each 
renewal term. Lease 1fl(b), R.013. The new rent was to be calculated by applying to the 
expiring term's rent by a multiplier equivalent to the increase in the Consumer Price Index, 
as published by the United States Department of Labor, over the duration of the expiring 
term.2 Pursuant to this formula, the annualized rent is now $56,900 or approximately 
$12.00/sq. ft.3 
2Thus, by way of example only, if the Consumer Price Index increased by only five 
percent from September 1993 to August 1998, the rent for the renewal term would be only five 
percent greater than the rent at the end of the primary term. 
3Although this fact is not part of the record below, there is no dispute between the 
parties as to this amount, or that it was calculated according to the formula set forth in the 
Lease. 
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For the purpose of determining White Pine's compliance with the renewal option's 
requirements, Utah Coal relied on September 9, 1993, the date of the Certificate of 
Occupancy issued by Park City, as the Commencement Date. R. 199. On that basis, the 
"window" for giving notice of renewal ran from May 13, 1998 to July 11, 1998. R.200. 
When White Pine failed to give written notice within that period, Utah Coal's attorney sent 
a letter to White Pine dated July 15, 1998, informing White Pine that the Lease would 
expire by its terms on September 9, 1998. R.200.4 On July 22, White Pine sent written 
notice that it intended to exercise the option to renew the Lease. R.197. There is no 
dispute that White Pine sent the July 22, 1998 letter only because it had received Utah 
Coal's July 15 letter. R.592. 
Several months earlier, during the spring of 1998, Kathy Sturgis had provided a 
copy of a portion of the Lease to White Pine's accountant so that he could calculate the 
rent increase which Ms. Sturgis believed would occur in September 1998. KS Dep. 15-
16, R. 171-172. At that time, she reviewed the Lease to determine which parts of it White 
Pine's accountant needed to make the calculation. R. 171-172. Although the renewal 
option provision appears on the first page of the Lease and the rent provisions appear on 
"The July 15, 1998 letter, R.200, was sent to the address set forth in the Lease for 
notices to White Pine. Lease 537, R.004. White Pine stated that it did not receive the letter 
until July 22, 1998, apparently because it had changed post office box numbers since executing 
the Lease. White Pine has not claimed that it had notified Utah Coal of the change in its 
mailing address. See, R.197. 
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the first and second pages, R.013-014, Ms. Sturgis did not notice the renewal option 
provision at that time: 
Q: Do you have any recollection as whether or not this notice provision 
grabbed your eye at all? 
A: No. I can tell you it did not or I would have done it. 
Q: When your accountant said, Wait until the end of August to determine 
the CPI, did he mention to you, But be sure you give notice? 
A: No, he did not. 
Q: When he said, Wait to the end of August to determine the CPI 
because it will be closer in time, did you look at the lease and say, 
That would be too close, it would be within the 60 days and we 
wouldn't have made our notice? 
A: No. I honestly missed this. No, he [the White Pine accountant] did 
not advise me. He did not - he didn't see it either, I guess. But no, 
I like to pride myself on being fairly detail oriented but I missed it. 
And he must have missed it because I just told him we were coming 
up on a rate increase and to look at how that would be calculated and 
what it might be. 
Q: So are there any other business aspects besides what you and Mr. 
Sturgis have described upon which you intend to rely for the 
allegation that it was inadvertent that you failed to exercise a written 
option or that there was excuse? 
A: WelL we missed it. It's my area of the business to watch. I missed 
it I put my original lease in our safe deposit box. I don't refer to 
my lease every month. We've had no occasion to have many lease 
disputes. I have a history of being in business there. We're in our 
13th year where our landlords had always called and said, What are 
you going to do? I mean, we're talking about the balloon [Bloom, the 
name of White Pine's former landlord] lease. It never even occurred 
to me that a lease would terminate because of our understanding and 
relationship developed. 
She [White Pine's former landlord] always called, I think her lease 
says 45 days ahead of time. She would always call and say, Hey, 
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let's have lunch. How's it going? Are you guys up for another year 
or two? So I didn't have any reason, other than I signed this fthe 
Lease with Utah Coall and maybe I should have committed it a 
hundred percent to memory. I just missed it. It is a detail that was 
not in the forefront of my mind at that time or I would have done it. 
Q: So you believed that the Powells should just continue to rent to you 
under the terms of the old lease? 
A: I believe we made a mistake. I fully admitted we made a mistake. It 
wasn't for any reason other than I was busy. We were busy doing 
other things in our business, wearing other hats. And immediately 
upon fining [sic] out, we tried to fix it 
R. 167-171 (emphasis added). 
Ms. Sturgis explained her frame of mind further, referring again to White Pine's 
leases with its previous landlord: 
I don't have a history in all of those leases, even though it might be in the 
leases, of a need to notice in writing. It has never been an important thing. 
We never had to do that. We had relationships with people. It's the way 
business was done in Park City. And frankly, it's the way it was being done 
in '93 and maybe now in '98 it does not work, but that is not my problem. 
KS Dep. 110, 111, R.251, 252; (emphasis added). 
(b) The Proceedings Below. 
When White Pine was unwilling to negotiate a new lease on terms acceptable to 
Utah Coal, Utah Coal filed an unlawful detainer action against White Pine on 
September 17, 1998. R.001-020. Utah Coal's complaint was straightforward: it sought 
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actual and treble damages, as well as costs and attorney fees under the Lease, based on the 
contention that the Lease had expired by its terms. 
In October 1998, White Pine answered the complaint and filed a counterclaim 
seeking, among other things, a declaration that White Pine was equitably excused from its 
failure to comply with the Lease's requirements for the exercise of the renewal option.5 
R.044-083. As grounds for equitable excuse, White Pine's counterclaim alleged, 
inter alia, that (a) White Pine's failure to comply with the requirements of the Lease was 
"the result of an honest and justifiable mistake," (b) White Pine's delay in attempting to 
give notice was "slight," (c) the delay could not have caused and did not cause any 
prejudice or harm to Utah Coal, and (d) termination of the Lease would unjustly enrich 
Utah Coal and result in an inequitable forfeiture of the money White Pine had spent in 
1993 renovate the building for use as a retail facility. R.064-065. The counterclaim also 
asserted that, based on advice allegedly received from White Pine's attorney prior to 
executing the Lease in 1993, the Sturgises believed that a 30-day cure provision assured 
them of an opportunity to remedy any default under the Lease.6 R.072. 
5White Pine's counterclaim also contained claims for breach of contract and unjust 
enrichment, neither of which is before this Court. 
Paragraph 24 of the Lease allows either party 30 days, upon written notice from the 
other, to cure certain enumerated defaults under the Lease. Lease, 1[24, R.007. White Pine 
has never argued that this provision made White Pine's untimely attempt to exeircise the 
renewal option legally effective. 
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In March 1999, Utah Coal filed its motion for summary judgment on its complaint 
for unlawful detainer based on the terms of the Lease's renewal option provision. R. 150-
246. White Pine opposed Utah Coal's motion and filed a cross-motion for partial summary 
judgment on White Pine's claim for declaratory relief, R.247-609, in which White Pine 
elaborated on the reasons for White Pine's allegedly "honest and justifiable mistake": 
According to the Sturgises they forgot about the written notice because, 
during the spring and summer of 1998, they were distracted by a number of 
important issues related to their business. They were involved in intense 
negotiations with the Park City Municipal Corporation over their lease of the 
Park City Golf Course for winter touring. They were also restructuring their 
management of White Pine, moving personnel and trying to hire and train 
employees. They were further distracted by domestic issues. See Undisp. 
Facts 120. In addition, they had been advised by their former attorney that 
the lease's default clause gave both parties at least 30 days within which to 
cure any problem that might arise. See Undisp. Facts 21. Thus, although 
they did not have the lease's requirement of written notice specifically in 
mind during the summer of 1998, they believed they had a 30-day grace 
period for any problem that would threaten the continued viability of their 
lease.7 
R.585. 
White Pine's cross-motion also relied on testimony to the effect that, in 1993, White 
Pine had spent approximately $105,000 in making "permanent improvements" to the Utah 
7White Pine's cross-motion offered no testimony from White Pine's 1993 attorney 
concerning what, if anything, he told the Sturgises in 1993 about the operation of the 30-day 
default clause. In any event, Ms. Sturgis testified that, notwithstanding the advice White Pine 
claimed it had received in 1993, White Pine did not ignore the Lease's renewal option notice 
requirement in reliance on any such advice. KS Dep.22, R. 265. 
10 
Coal building, R.596, 583, but did not present evidence of the value of the "forfeiture" 
White Pine would actually suffer if the Lease were terminated. In addition, the cross-
motion contended that White Pine's 1993 expenditures had increased the value of the Utah 
Coal building, R.594, but White Pine presented no evidence to establish the extent to 
which the increase in value was due to White Pine's expenditures, as distinct from, for 
example, upward price pressure in the Park City real estate market in general. R.592; 
R.706. Finally, rather than argue that moving to another location would sacrifice its 
goodwill, White Pine's position was that it would go out of business if it lost its Lease 
because White Pine could not afford to pay a fair market rent. CS Dep. 152, R.562. 
On July 26, 1999, at the conclusion of oral argument, the trial court announced its 
ruling that White Pine was equitably excused from its failure to comply with the Lease's 
requirements for the exercise of the renewal option. Transcript of July 26, 1999 Hearing 
("Tr.") 49-55, R. 1119-1125. That ruling is reflected in the Judgment signed by the trial 
court on August 6, 1999. R.741-746. In its comments on July 26, the court explained the 
reasoning behind certain of the findings and conclusions set forth in the Judgment.8 
The court observed that (1) neither "mere mistake and forgetfulness" nor the 
"lease's 30-day cure provision" were sufficient to establish a defense of equitable excuse, 
8The court's July 26, 1999 comments are described here at some length in order to 
provide the basis and context for various points of argument and analysis raised later in this 
brief. 
11 
and (2) the "distractions" faced by White Pine's principals were neither Utah Coal's 
responsibility nor its concern. Tr.50, 51, 54; R. 1120,1121, 1124. Nonetheless, the court 
concluded that all three — forgetfulness, the 30-day provision and the distractions — set 
a contextual background for the determination that White Pine's mistake was "honest." 
As reflected in the Judgment, the court expressed the view that the concept "honest and 
justifiable" is "illuminate[ed] by ajuxtaposition with willful and gross negligence" and that 
White Pine's conduct was "certainly not. . . willful or gross negligence" Tr.50, R.1120. 
When asked to elaborate further on its findings supporting the conclusion that White Pine's 
mistake was "justifiable", the court responded: 
I'm going to find that because there is no change in position, because there 
is a substantial loss, because the mistake is honest, the term "justifiable" 
simply means whether or not the court accepts that as sufficient, and I'm 
going to find in this situation in this factual setting that this mistake is honest 
and justifiable. 
Tr.52, R.1122. 
The court also found that White Pine "would suffer substantial and irreparable harm 
if [the] delay were not excused." Tr.51, R. 1121. When asked to expand on that finding, 
the court explained: 
That's on the basis of the decision to invest between $75,000 and $100,000 
in a business with the expectation of a 20 year right to stay, clearly that was 
continued [sic] on giving notice on [sic] substantial rent increases during that 
time period, the loss of that investment as well as the expectation of them 
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staying in one location for twenty years, such as your customer base and 
clientele understand where you are and where they can find you .... 
Tr.53, R.1123. 
White Pine's counsel asked the court whether it was making any finding with 
respect to Utah Coal's conduct. The court stated that the record before it contained "no 
suggestion" that Utah Coal "was responsible" for White Pine's failure to give notice as 
required under the Lease. Tr.54, R.1124. 
Utah Coal subsequently filed a motion to bifurcate and dismiss the remaining claims 
not addressed in the trial court's partial summary judgment, R.787-788, 788-793, as well 
as a motion and supporting memorandum to certify the Judgment as final pursuant to 
Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. R.806-815. White Pine then filed a motion 
to amend its counterclaim to include additional claims against Utah Coal, most of which 
related to incidents and activity that allegedly occurred subsequent to the entry of the 
Judgment in August, 1999. R.816-818, 818-865. 
Following oral argument on March 30, 2000, R. 1071-1126, the trial court granted 
Utah Coal's motion to certify, denied its motion to bifurcate and to dismiss, and granted 
White Pine's motion to amend its counterclaim. The trial court's order certifying the 
Judgment was entered on May 2, 2000, R.942-945. A copy of the Order Granting 
Plaintiffs Motion to Certify Partial Summary Judgment Under Rule 54(b) is included in 
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the Addendum as Exhibit 4. This appeal followed that order, with a Notice of Appeal filed 
on May 11, 2000. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The rule in Utah with respect to the exercise of options is that of strict 
compliance. "[B]arring special circumstances such as misrepresentation or waiver, 
exercise of an option must be made strictly in accordance with its terms." Geisdorfv. 
Doughty, 972 P.2d 67, 74 (Utah 1998). Although there are circumstances in which 
"deviation" from strict compliance may be equitably excused; such circumstances are 
limited, id. at 71. The circumstances in this case are such that both Geisdorf and its 
predecessor, I.X.L. Furniture & Carpet Installment House v. Berets, 32 Utah 454, 91 P. 
279 (1907), are controlling. On that basis, equitable excuse is not available. To excuse 
a commercial tenant from having to strictly comply with the notice requirement of the 
tenant's lease renewal option under the circumstances of this case, in which the tenant 
admits that it was too busy doing other things and simply "missed it," is contrary to well-
established Utah law. 
2. The trial court erred in its application of certain dicta in Geisdorf by 
transforming that language into a new and vaguely defined theory of equitable defense. 
3. The trial court's grant of summary judgment in this matter is unsupported by 
Utah law and the record in this case. 
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ARGUMENT 
The issue in this case is whether this Court will allow this case to change long-
standing Utah law on options, merely to satisfy the needs of one commercial tenant that 
inadvertently, and inexplicably, forgot its obligation to exercise its option to renew its 
lease, as well as the deadline set by the lease for doing so. 
POINT I: BOTH THIS COURT'S 1998 DECISION IN GEISDORF AND ITS 
EARLIER DECISION IN I.X.L. ARE ON POINT AND REQUIRE 
THAT WHITE PINE BE HELD TO THE STANDARD OF STRICT 
COMPLIANCE WITH THE RENEWAL OPTION. 
A. Geisdorf. 
Barely one year before the trial court issued the Judgment which is the subject of 
this appeal, this Court spoke clearly to commercial tenants operating under leases which 
require written notice of the exercise of an option to renew. In Geisdorf v. Doughty, 
972 P.2d 67, 74 (Utah 1998), this Court stated: 
We uphold the rule of law that barring special circumstances such as 
misrepresentation or waiver, exercise of an option must be made strictly in 
accordance with its terms. 
Despite White Pine's arguments to the contrary, Geisdorf dictates the outcome of this case. 
The facts before this Court concerning White Pine's conduct are legally indistinguishable 
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from those presented in Geisdorf9, and the trial court's conclusion should have followed 
Geisdorf. In failing to correctly read and apply Geisdorf, the trial court committed a 
fundamental error of law which requires a reversal of its decision and the grant of 
summary judgment in favor of Utah Coal. 
Just like White Pine, Mr. Geisdorf, a commercial tenant, failed to provide his 
landlord written notice of his intention to renew his lease by the deadline set forth in that 
lease. Just like Utah Coal, the landlord wrote a letter to the tenant while the lease was still 
I 
in effect, advising that the lease would expire in less than two months, according to its 
terms.10 Just like White Pine, Mr. Geisdorf quickly wrote back, before the lease had 
expired, purporting to give written confirmation of a prior alleged oral notification of his 
intent to renew his lease. 
Mr. Geisdorf s frame of mind seems to have almost foreshadowed White Pine's. 
As this Court noted, 
^h i t e Pine will undoubtedly argue that the fact that it spent money in 1993 remodeling 
the Utah Coal building distinguishes this case from Geisdorf, As discussed below, this 
purported distinction is ultimately a distinction without a difference, as a matter of both law 
and fact. 
10During the July 26, 1999 oral argument, White Pine's counsel misstated the facts of 
Geisdorf when he said: "the delay there was a period of months, and the delay was after the 
term had ended. I mean the notice was given months after the lease term had ended." Tr.34, 
R.1104. Both the landlord and tenant's letters occurred well before the lease was due to 
expire. 
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Geisdorf testified that he had 'forgotten' that the exercise of the option 
needed to be in writing. He then testified repeatedly that he 'never even 
considered [exercising the option in writing].' Thus, having had ready access 
to a copy of the initial Lease Agreement, Geisdorf did not inform himself of, 
and subsequently protect, his interest under the Lease Agreement. 
972 P.2d at 73. This Court reacted by quoting from its earlier decision in John Call 
Engineering, Inc. v. Manti City Corp., 743 P.2d 1205, 1208 (Utah 1987): 
'[E]ach party has the burden to read and understand the terms of a contract 
before he or she affixes his or her signature to it. A party may not sign a 
contract and thereafter assert ignorance or failure to read the contract as a 
defense.' 
White Pine's failure was, in a sense, even more profound than Mr. Geisdorf s, who 
apparently merely forgot that he had to give notice in writing. White Pine, on the other 
hand, forgot that it had to give notice at all. Ms. Sturgis testified unequivocally that even 
when she consulted White Pine's accountant in Spring 1998, before the notice window 
opened in May 1998, and copied relevant portions of the Lease for the accountant, she 
failed to take note of the option renewal provision on the first page of the Lease. KS Dep. 
16; R.271. White Pine completely forgot that it had any obligation whatsoever with 
respect to exercising the option, and, despite the clear language of the Lease, viewed 
September 1998 as merely the occasion for a rent increase, rather than the inception of a 
new term under the Lease, conditioned on a proper renewal. KS Dep. 110, R.252. 
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This Court's response to White Pine should be no different from the Court's 
response in Geisdorf: a tenant has the obligation to inform itself of its obligations under 
its lease. If this Court had intended to excuse (1) forgetting a notice deadline, (2) 
forgetting the fact that notice had to be given in writing, or (3) forgetting, as was the case 
here, that the written notice requirement even existed, Geisdorf certainly presented a 
factual record which invited this Court to recognize such an excuse. This Court chose not 
to do so. 
White Pine's cross-motion suggested that the "modern" rule is different, and that 
it eschews "hyper-technical legal arguments," presumably including Utah Coal's argument 
that White Pine cannot escape from having failed to strictly comply with the Lease. See 
R.587, 590. The first answer to that proposition is obvious: when this Court issued its 
decision in Geisdorf in 1998, it had the benefit of each and every case that White Pine 
cited to support its argument for equitable relief, and the Court adopted none. More 
importantly, this Court's opinion in Geisdorfflatly rejected an apparently similar argument 
made on behalf of Mr. Geisdorf: 
Strict compliance is not arcane ritualism at work, or as Geisdorf suggests, 
'hocus-pocus' . . . insisting upon a party's compliance with contractual language 
may seem to some to be punctilious. However, this is not necessarily the case. 
972 P.2d at 71 (footnote omitted). 
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White Pine comes before this Court in no better position than Mr. Geisdorf and, in 
fact, is in a far less defensible one for having completely forgotten that it had any notice 
obligations whatsoever under the Lease. Here, just as in Geisdorf, it is neither "arcane 
ritualism" nor overly "punctilious" for this Court to hold White Pine to the same standard 
it applied to Mr. Geisdorf. 
Accordingly, since White Pine has not even attempted to show "misrepresentation 
or waiver" [by Utah Coal] {id. at 74), this Court's inquiry need not proceed further. As 
a matter of well-settled and expressly stated law, the partial summary judgment granted 
in favor of White Pine must be reversed, and this Court should direct the entry of 
summary judgment in favor of Utah Coal. 
B. I.X.L. 
White Pine is correct: a number of jurisdictions permit strict compliance with option 
requirements to be "equitably excused" based on various formulae in which the conduct 
of the parties and the harm to each are weighed and a result is reached that purports to 
balance the harm. See, e.g., J.N.A. Realty Corp. v. Cross Bay Chelsea, Inc., 366 N.E.2d 
1313, 397 N.Y. S.2d 958 (1977); F.B. Fountain Co. v. Stein, 118 A. 47, 97 Conn. 619 
(1933). Utah, however, has never adopted that rule in relation to its law of commercial 
lease renewal options, and strict compliance remains the rule. I.X.L. Furniture & Carpet 
Installment House v. Berets, 32 Utah 454, 91 P. 279 (1907); Geisdorf, supra. See, also, 
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Upland Industries v. Pacific Gamble Robinson Co., 684 P.2d 638,640 (Utah 1984) (unless 
optionor waives terms, nothing less than strict compliance will suffice)(quoting Williston 
on Contracts § 61D (3rd ed. 1957)). 
This rule is well-settled and, as to the exercise of options to renew commercial real 
estate leases, it has been the express law in the State of Utah since at least 1907 when the 
case of I.X.L. was decided. More than ninety years later, the circumstances of the instant 
case are remarkably similar to those of I.X.L. 
The commercial tenant in I.X.L. had an option to renew its lease and failed to 
timely exercise that option, by only a couple of days, for reasons "which were not 
unavoidable nor accidental," because the tenant "inadvertently overlooked the matter of 
making a formal request of respondents for a renewal" of the lease. 91 P. at 279. In the 
instant case, White Pine's counsel emphasized that White Pine's conduct was inadvertent. 
Tr.25, R.1095. In I.X.L., as in the instant case, the tenant attempted to circumvent the 
requirement of strict compliance by pleading facts that might provide an equitable excuse 
of the failure to comply with the option. In I.X.L., however, the tenant was not 
successful, even though the tenant had made improvements to the premises, had developed 
goodwill in the business at the location of the premises, had otherwise complied with the 
lease terms and even though the landlord had reason to know that the tenant was planning 
to renew the lease and remain in the premises. 91 P. at 279-80. 
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Appellant attempted to avoid the consequences of a late request by setting up 
some alleged equities. There is, however, no equity in the facts pleaded, 
even if proved just as alleged, that would authorize any court to grant the 
relief prayed for. Courts have no right to disregard any provisions of a 
contract, or to save rights that are lost thereunder through the act of the party 
asking relief, unless it is made to appear that it would be unconscionable or 
clearly inequitable to do or not to do so. Nothing of that kind appears from 
the pleadings in this case. Appellant pleads nothing that would have 
prevented it from making the request at the proper time except mere 
inadvertence. ... Appellant's manager knew, and always must have had the 
ready means of knowing, when the old lease expired. ... Nor is the fact that 
at least two of the respondents had knowledge, through conversations with 
appellant's manager, that he intended to request a new lease available. A 
mere intention to make a request was not sufficient. The allegations do not 
go to the extent that respondents in any way prevented appellant's manager 
from making a request. 
Finally, it is claimed that the contract should be construed and applied most 
strongly against respondents under the equity rule, which seeks to prevent 
forfeitures, and that the acts of appellant in seeking a renewal should be 
favorably considered in its behalf for the same reason. But the rule 
contended for has no application to the facts in this case. No forfeiture is 
involved. Appellant at most, lost nothing but an opportunity by not 
performing a condition required of it, which was necessary to the enjoyment 
of a right to an additional term, and which was to be paid for when obtained. 
If a man is invited to attend a sale of his neighbor's property at a certain 
time, and is given the right of bidding for and purchasing it, and fails to 
attend the sale at the hour fixed, he may miss an opportunity, but he: forfeits 
nothing. So here, appellant simply lost the right to a renewal of a new term. 
He forfeited nothing in the legal sense that that term is used to respondents. 
91 P. at 282-83. 
In 1998, this Court reaffirmed the long-standing rule of/.XL., requiring strict 
compliance with the terms of an option in a case involving the option to renew a 
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commercial real property lease. Geisdorf v. Doughty, 972 P.2d 67 (Utah 1998). In 1999, 
the trial court in this case created an exception to that rule that is not only contrary to 
existing Utah law, but virtually swallows the rule. The trial court's new exception must 
be dismantled. 
POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TRANSFORMING DICTA FROM 
GEISDORFINTO A DEFENSE AGAINST WHITE PINE'S FAILURE 
TO STRICTLY COMPLY WITH THE OPTION. 
In Geisdorf, this Court acknowledged that in some "supervening, excusing" 
instances, "deviation from strict compliance may be equitably excused." 972 P.2d at 71. 
Although the facts presented by this case do not differ from those presented in Geisdorf 
in any legally material way, and therefore should not lead to a different result, White Pine 
has strained to make them seem different by characterizing White Pine's conduct as 
"purely inadvertent" and the result of an "honest and justifiable mistake, not willful or 
gross negligence". R.586. However, White Pine's purported "excuse" cannot, and will 
not, fit within the narrow haven from strict compliance found in the dicta of Geisdorf. 
A. The Language On Which White Pine Relies is Merely Dicta. 
Apparently responding to an argument concerning "arcane ritualism" and "hocus-
pocus ", the Geisdorf opinion indicated that under certain circumstances," strict compliance 
may be equitably excused." 972 P.2d at 71(emphasis added). Where the optionor's 
conduct prevents strict compliance or truly exigent circumstances exist (such as a blizzard), 
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strict compliance may be excused. Nielson v. Doubray, 652 P.2d 1293 (Utah 1982) 
Neither situation is presented by this case.11 The other circumstance which may excuse 
strict compliance arises when the optionee's failure " 'to comply was not due to willful 
or gross negligence on the part of the optionee, but was rather the result of an honest and 
justifiable mistake' ", Geisdorf, 972 P.2d at 71, adopting and quoting the formulation set 
forth in Cattle Feeders, Inc. v. Jordan, 549 S.W.2d 29, 33 (Tex.App. 1977). It is this 
language on which White Pine relies in trying to obtain relief within Utah law. 
There are, however, three problems with White Pine's reliance. The first is that 
the Cattle Feeders' language quoted in Geisdorfis dicta. An examination of Cattle Feeders 
reveals the second problem: the quoted language is also dicta in Cattle Feeders. 
In that decision, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals ruled against the optionee, stating 
that in the absence of "equities", an option agreement requires strict compliance. The 
court stated that the relevant "equities", as set forth in another Texas case, Jones v. Gibbs, 
130 S.W.2d 265, 272-273 (Tex.Com.App. 1939), consist of circumstances in which the 
optionee's strict compliance is (1) prevented by some act of the optionor such as waiver 
11
 In several cases relied upon by White Pine, the court was willing to grant relief in 
large part because the landlord's conduct troubled the court because the conduct was 
inequitable or inappropriate. See Wharf Restaurant Inc. v. Port of Seattle, 605 P.2d 334, 341 
(Wash.App. 1979); J.N.A. Realty Corp. v. CrossBay Chelsea, Inc.. supra, 366 N.E.2d 1313 
(N.Y. 1977) (a 4-3 decision with a vigorous dissent); Linn v. LaSalle National Bank, 424 
N.E.2d 676 (Ill.App. 1981); Trollen v. City ofWashaba, 287 N.W.2d 645 (Minn. 1979). 
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or misleading conduct, 549 S.W.2d at 32-33, or (2) excused because the optionee's 
conduct "in failing to comply was not due to willful or gross negligence on the part of the 
optionee but was rather the result of an honest and justifiable mistake," 549 S.W.2d at 33. 
In Cattle Feeders, however, there was no evidence that the failure to timely notify the 
optionor was the result of any mistake at all — honest, justifiable, or otherwise. Id. 
The third and most significant problem with White Pine's position is that in Jones 
v. Gibbs, the case on which Cattle Feeders relies, the alleged failure to comply with the 
option terms was caused by the optionor's misleading conduct. Although the concept of 
"honest and justifiable mistake" is mentioned in Jones, the case is actually about the 
improper conduct of the optionor, rather than the optionee's conduct, making Jones similar 
to the Utah case of Nielson v. Droubay, supra, which did not involve a mistake of any 
kind. Jones v. Gibbs, 130 S.W.2d 271, 273. 
Thus, White Pine's defense in the instant case, that its inadvertence qualifies as an 
"honest and justifiable mistake," is extremely attenuated, since it is based on dicta, which 
is based on dicta, which is based on dicta. When the layers of dicta are carefully lifted, 
one by one, it becomes evident that this Court could not have intended the term "honest 
and justifiable mistake" to embrace "mere inadvertence," or forgetfulness, by an optionee. 
In cases involving equity issues, the scope of review is broad and the appellate court 
"may weigh evidence and determine the facts." Bustimante v. Bustimante, 645 P.2d 40, 
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42 (Utah 1982). With respect to conclusions of law, however, the appellate court affords 
no deference to the trial court. "Even in an equity action, we review the trial court's legal 
conclusions under a correction-of-error standard according those conclusions no particular 
deference." Englertv. Zane, 848 P.2d 165, 168 (Ut.App. 1993)(citingBellon v. Malnar, 
808 P.2d 1089, 1092 (Utah 1991); Grayson Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 
(Utah 1989)). In this case the trial court accepted some dicta that was vigorously argued 
by White Pine, misinterpreted it and misapplied it to develop new law without sufficient 
basis. Because as a matter of law, mere inadvertence does not qualify as an "honest and 
justifiable mistake," this Court can, and should, reverse the trial court. 
B. The Trial Court's Development of A New Defense for Mere Inadvertence 
Under the Rubric of "Honest and Justifiable Mistake" Offends Basic Principles 
of Utah Contract Law, Does Nothing to Clarify Existing Law and Will Only 
Create More Uncertainty and, Therefore, More Litigation. 
The language regarding mistake on which the trial court fashioned an equitable 
remedy to apply in the instant case will lead to less clarity and more litigation in an area 
that needs certainty, rather than more commercial confusion. If the lower court's decision 
is allowed to stand, the law of options in relation to commercial lease renewals will only 
grow more uncertain as increasing confusion arises as to what will and will not excuse 
strict compliance with an option's terms. 
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White Pine failed to timely exercise its option to renew the Lease because it had 
forgotten both its obligation to give notice and the deadline for giving it. Kathy Sturgis 
testified that she "missed it." R. 169. In its Judgment, the trial court concluded that White 
Pine's failure to exercise its option on time was "an honest and justifiable mistake." 
Judgment at2, Paragraph5, R.745, and explained that "[a]n honest and justifiable mistake, 
as referenced in the Utah case law on the subject, is defined in contrast to a mistake 
resulting from willful conduct or gross negligence." Id. at %. 
Such a definition, however, which divides all mistakes into just two categories, 
either "honest and justifiable" or those "resulting from willful conduct or gross 
negligence," creates more problems than the definition could ever resolve.12 Two 
problems are of paramount importance. First, how can this definition of mistake be 
reconciled with existing case law? Second, does it reflect an impermissible shifting of the 
burden of proof by permitting White Pine's conduct to be excused unless Utah Coal proves 
White Pine's failure to give timely notice was "willful conduct or gross negligence"? 
Unilateral mistake sufficient to justify the equitable remedy of recission has been 
examined in several Utah cases, but the trial court's ruling in this case is not compatible 
12White Pine's counsel may have anticipated this difficulty when he invented a new 
term of art in his argument: "Fact number three your Honor, and this is extremely important, 
the 11 day delay in giving notice to extend was not the result of any willfulness, but was 
simple and justifiable inadvertence." Tr.25, R.1095 (emphasis added). 
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with settled law. In Equitable Life & Casualty Insurance Co. v. David E. Ross II, 849 
P.2d 1197 (Ut. App. 1993), this Court cited its earlier decision, Klas v. Van Wagoner, 829 
P.2d 135 (Ut.App. 1992), to restate the elements necessary to obtain rescission based on 
unilateral mistake. The key element for the purpose of this analysis requires that, 
generally, "the mistake must have occurred notwithstanding the exercise of ordinary 
diligence by the party making the mistake." 849 P.2d at 1190 (other citations omitted). 
White Pine failed to exercise "ordinary diligence" in two respects. First, at least 
as of Spring 1998, White Pine did not realize that it even had to exercise its option to 
renew. As a result, White Pine made no effort to give notice until it received Utah Coal's 
July 15, 1998 letter, advising White Pine that the notice "window" had closed.13 Second, 
White Pine's claim that it "missed" its obligation because it was "busy doing other things" 
conflicts with the customary requirement that ordinary diligence must be exercised. At 
least one appellate court has squarely held that not only is being busy no excuse, but it is 
[A] state of affairs which . . . businesses strive to achieve. Thus, the fact 
that [tenant's] administrative oversight was attributable to [its] workload . . . 
in no way shifts or lessens [its] responsibility for this error. . . . Thus, 
neither [tenant's] failure to give timely notice nor its justification therefore 
evidences either the degree of negligence or the unavoidable circumstances 
necessary to justify even equitable intervention. 
13This behavior is far different than that of the tenants in several cases relied upon by 
White Pine below, where the tenant provided evidence of some effort to protect its own 
interests. Duncan v. G.E.W., 526 A.2d 1358 (D.C.App. 1987); Fleming v. Equitable Life, 
818 P.2d 813 (Kan.App. 1991); Fletcher v. Frisbee, 404 A.2d 1106 (N.H. 1979). 
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Western Savings Fund Society of Philadelphia v. S.£.P.r.A,285Pa.Super. 187, 196,427 
A.2d 175 (Pa.Super. 1981) (footnotes and citations omitted). 
Geisdorf recognized that where a party has failed to read and understand the terms 
of his own contract, he or she cannot obtain relief from the contract terms. 972 P.2d at 
73. See also: John Call Engineering, supra, 743 P.2d at 1207-1208, 1209; Resource 
Management Co. v. Weston Ranch and Livestock Co., Inc., 706 P.2d 1028, 1047-1048 
(Utah 1985). Nonetheless, in this case, the trial court concluded that the mistake was not 
the result of willful conduct or gross negligence, while failing to consider whether ordinary 
diligence was exercised. In the absence of ordinary diligence, can White Pine's mistake 
still be justifiable?14 
14Put differently, will equity grant relief to a negligent tenant? White Pine will argue 
that equity can and will grant such relief, citing cases from a number of jurisdictions that have 
adopted this lenient rule, despite the unique character of an option as an offer. However, the 
rule in many other jurisdictions (often a rule of long standing) is that equity will .not afford a 
tenant relief from his own negligence. See, e.g., Bekins v. Prudential Insurance Co., 176 
Cal.App.3d 245, 221 Cal.Rptr. 738 (1985); Berkow v. Hammer, 53 S.E.2d 1 (1949); Crown 
Construction Co., Inc. v. Huddleston, 961 S.W.2d 552 (Tex.App. 1997) (although negligence 
may not preclude relief, gross neglect precluded a finding of "honest and justifiable mistake"); 
Host International, Inc. v. Summa Corp., 583 P.2d 1080 (Nev. 1978) (quoting the Utah case, 
I.X.L.); Koch v. H&SDevelopment Co., 163 So.2d 710, 722 (1964); McClellan v. Ashley, 200 
Va. 38, 40, 104 S.E.2d 55 (1958); In re Millyard Restaurant, 110 B.R. 103, 105 (D.N.H. 
1990) ("obviously a simple 'didn't think of it' excuse cannot suffice or the . . . exception 
would eat up the rule"); Roberts v. Canning, 455 P.2d 302, 204 (Okla. 1969); Sentara 
Enterprises, Inc. v. CCP Associates, 243 Va. 39, 45, 413 S.E.2d 595 (1992); Simons v. 
Young, 93 Cal.App.3d 170, 181, 155 Cal.Rptr. 460 (1979); Trueman-Aspen v. Northmill 
Investment Corp., 728 P.2d 343, 344-345 (Colo.App. 1986). 
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White Pine will undoubtedly argue that because it is not seeking a rescission, the 
"ordinary diligence" expected of a party seeking rescission does not apply. However, 
there is no reason why it should not. White Pine is, in a sense, seeking relief less even-
handed than rescission, which seeks to restore the parties to their pre-contract positions. 
By contrast, White Pine wants to retain the principal benefit of the option and the Lease 
(the low rent) without having observed the option's straightforward notice requirement. 
However, Utah courts are not inclined to offer the aid of equity to parties who make no 
effort to protect their rights. "Equity aids the vigilant." In re Petition of Cook, 
882 P.2d 656, 659 (Utah 1994); Peck v. Monson, 652 P.2d 1325, 1328 (Utah 1982). 
While both Cook and Peck articulated this settled principal in the context of laches, its 
application to this case is no less appropriate. 
Ms. Sturgis' testimony precisely captured White Pine's attitude toward its notice 
obligation, describing it as merely a "detail that was not in the forefront of my mind at 
that time." KS Dep. 20-21; R.266-267. Months later, Ms. Sturgis could only express 
consternation and defiance during her deposition, in language that bears repeating: 
[A] need to give notice in writing . . . has never been an important thing. 
We never had to do that. We had relationships with people. It's the way 
business was done in Park City. And frankly, it's the way it was being done 
in '93 and maybe now in '98 it does not work, but that is not mv problem. 
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KS Dep. 110-112, R.251-252 (emphasis added). A party expressing such a sentiment 
hardly deserves the sympathetic ear of equity to seek relief from its own negligence. 
POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT IN THIS MATTER 
Even assuming that the test applied by the trial court was the correct one, an 
examination of both the evidence before the court and its reasoning clearly shows that the 
court's conclusions lack both factual and analytical support. In some instances, there are 
simply no facts which support a particular conclusion. In others, the conclusion reached 
by the court does not follow from the evidence on which the court indicated it had relied. 
A. Assuming That White Pine's Failure to Give Notice Was "Honest", There Was 
No Basis for Concluding That It Was "Justified". 
The errors in this aspect of the trial court's analysis are evident from two statements 
it made at the conclusion of the July 26, 1999 argument. First, as noted above, it 
approached the determination of whether White Pine had made an "honest and justifiable 
mistake" by viewing that characterization as "illuminated by a juxtaposition with willful 
and gross negligence." Tr.50, R.1120. Second, when asked for the findings supporting 
its conclusion that White Pine's mistake was "justifiable", the court said, in substance, that 
that "term ... simply means whether or not the Court accepts ... as sufficient" that (1) 
there was no change in Utah Coal's position, (2) there would be a substantial loss to White 
Pine, and (3) White Pine's mistake was honest. Tr.52, R.1122. 
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By applying this analysis, however, the trial court effectively eliminated the 
requirement that White Pine prove "justification" as an independent element of its 
affirmative defense of equitable excuse. Instead, the trial court was willing to view White 
Pine's mistake as "justified" because it seemed "honest" and because of the alleged 
consequences of denying White Pine relief. Not only is this reasoning circular and 
tautological, but it ignores the plain language of the test the court sought to apply. 
That test — "honest and justifiable mistake" — is incontrovertibly a two-pronged 
test, each prong of which must be separately satisfied. It is not enough for the honesty of 
a mistake to establish its justification; if it were, all genuine mistakes (as opposed to 
deceptions) would automatically have to be deemed justified, and the "justification" prong 
of the test becomes entirely superfluous. Equally important, virtually any mistake would 
then entitle its maker to equitable relief from its contractual obligations, thereby lowering 
the threshold for relief so low as to virtually eliminate the contract itself as a meaningful 
instrument for ascertaining the enforceable obligations of the parties. 
White Pine will undoubtedly argue that the record supports the conclusion that 
White Pine's mistake was justified. The record does not. What the record reveals is that 
White Pine completely forgot that it even had to give Utah Coal notice of its intent to 
exercise the renewal option, not that it forgot when or how it had to exercise the option. 
White Pine tried to excuse its mistake as "mere inadvertence" by claiming that the 
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Sturgises were extremely distracted during the two-month notice window and that they, in 
any event, believed that the Lease's 30-day cure provision guaranteed them a safety net 
against any mistakes they might make. The logic of this argument is, however, fatally 
flawed. First, White Pine did not refrain from providing the requisite notice to Utah Coal 
in reliance on the 30-day cure provision. KS Dep. 22; R.265. That provision of the Lease 
played no role in the actual events before the court and is, therefore, wholly irrelevant to 
the analysis of whether the mistake was either honest or justified. 
Second, since White Pine's mistake had effectively been made before the notice 
window ever opened on approximately May 13,1998, White Pine cannot reasonably make 
excuses by pointing to distractions that allegedly arose during the window. White Pine 
may have been "distracted" during that period from discharging many responsibilities, but 
giving notice to Utah Coal could not have been one of them, since White Pine failed to 
recognize that it even had that responsibility. Moreover, there is no evidence that suggests 
that, but for the distractions, White Pine would have realized, and acted upon, its notice 
obligation under the Lease.15 
15White Pine has offered no evidence that establishes that, but for Utah Coal's July 15, 
1998 letter, White Pine would have ever recognized its failure until the Lease actually expired. 
The mere fact that White Pine's accountant suggested deferring the calculation of the rent 
increase "until right up close to the time [it would become effective]," KS Dep. 17; R.270, 
does not in any way prove that, even then, White Pine would have realized its notice 
obligation. 
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Even if White Pine's alleged distractions could theoretically or logically be credited 
with some role in explaining White Pine's actions, or its failure to act, the evidence 
relating to the alleged distractions fails to establish the significance White Pine has sought 
to impart to them. Considering the alleged distractions individually: 
1) Negotiations with Park Citv. The allegedly "intense" negotiations with Park 
City concerning White Pine's lease for its cross-country touring center (KS Dep. 18) were, 
according to Mr. Sturgis, triggered by a letter sent to Park City by White Pine itself in 
Spring 1998. CS Dep.77, R.566. Ms. Sturgis testified that her conversation with White 
Pine's accountant occurred prior to White Pine "noticing" Park City. KS Dep. 19, R.268. 
Thus, not only had White Pine's mistake preceded the discussions with Park City, but the 
negotiations were indisputably anticipated by White Pine before the notice window ever 
opened in May 1998.16 White Pine, however, made no effort to quantify, in either relative 
or absolute terms, how much time or effort these discussions consumed during the notice 
period itself.17 
16During the July 26, 1999 oral argument, White Pine's counsel stated, "Park City was 
threatening to take it [the cross-country center lease] away from them [the Sturgises]." 
R. 1096. Nothing in the record before the court below even suggests such a gloss on the 
negotiations between White Pine and the City. 
17In this regard, a wide range of both questions and possible facts cry out for answers 
and proof: (1) What were the dates of communications between White Pine and Park City 
concerning the cross-country touring lease — before, during and after the window period? 
(2) To what extent were these communications accomplished by letter as distinguished from 
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2) Notice of an Employee's Departure. White Pine claimed it was also distracted 
because a White Pine employee gave notice that he was leaving for another job. R.597, 
585; KS Dep. 18-19, R.268-269. There was no evidence, however, as to when White 
Pine received the buyer's notice, when the buyer actually left White Pine or the extent to 
which this situation occupied the time and attention of White Pine's principals during the 
notice period itself. 
3) Management Restructuring. White Pine claimed it was also distracted because 
it was restructuring its management. R.593. The only elaboration provided was the 
statement that White Pine's office manager was being elevated to the position of business 
manager. KS Dep. 18, R.269 White Pine offered no evidence beyond those bare 
assertions, and failed to explain how a promotion of one employee could be such a 
distraction. 
arguably more time-consuming meetings? (3) Who performed, and when, the "analysis, 
valuations" to which Ms. Sturgis alluded in explaining why the discussions were "intense"? 
KS Dep. 18, R.269. (4) To the extent that these "analysis, valuations" were performed by or 
on behalf of White Pine, were they done by the Sturgises or by someone else (for example, 
White Pine's accountant), how extensive were they, and were they different in substance or 
degree than analyses customarily performed by White Pine in the ordinary course of its 
business? All of this information, to the extent that it exists, would be uniquely within White 
Pine's possession. Even if not elicited in the course of the Sturgises' depositions, facts 
responsive to these issues could have, and should have, been placed before the trial court by 
way of affidavits in order to satisfy White Pine's burden of proof if it sought to rely, even in 
part, upon the negotiation with Park City to establish the "justification" element of the 
affirmative defense of equitable excuse. 
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4) Death of a Pet. White Pine also relied on the death of the family dog: "we had 
a dog die that had been a longtime friend. . . ." KS Dep. 19, R.268. Although a pet's 
death is always sad, the record contains no evidence as to when the dog died, or how this 
unfortunate occurrence operated for the duration of the two-month notice period to prevent 
the Sturgises from exercising the Lease renewal option. 
5) The Sturgises' Child. White Pine asserted that the Sturgises' two-year-old child 
represented another distraction. The only evidence before the court concerning this matter 
was Ms. Sturgis' statement that, "[W]e have a two-year-old." KS Dep. 19R.269. White 
Pine offered no evidence to suggest that the Sturgises' child was even in the midst of the 
ordinary "terrible two's," much less that the child was suffering from any unusual 
difficulties18 or that the Sturgises were unable to devote the customary amount of time and 
attention to their business affairs as a result of child-rearing responsibilities. 
Thus, even assuming that "distractions" could, at least in theory, supply the 
"justification" for White Pine's failure to comply with its contractual obligation to give 
written notice of its intent to renew the Lease, the evidence White Pine presented in 
support of its cross-motion failed to do so. 
18Once again taking liberties with the evidence, White Pine's counsel made a 
transparent play for sympathy, stating that the Sturgises' "daughter who was two years old at 
the time . . . was having some problems with the death of [the family] dog." R.1096. 
However, Ms. Sturgis — the child's mother — never suggested this connection. 
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As a matter of logic, the evidence not only failed to show that White Pine would 
have performed but for the alleged distractions, but it also strongly suggested the contrary: 
even in the absence of the alleged distractions, White Pine would, in all likelihood, have 
never realized its failure until Utah Coal brought that failure to White Pine's attention. 
Moreover, apart from revealing the logical fallacy of White Pine's argument, the evidence 
also fails to achieve the quality demanded of "proof", as opposed to post-hoc 
rationalization. Based on the testimony before it, the trial court lacked sufficient 
evidentiary basis to conclude that the circumstances relied upon by White Pine, singly or 
in any combination, did, in fact, justify or prevent White Pine from recognizing and 
discharging its notice obligation under the Lease. 
B. White Pine Failed to Establish What Legally Cognizable Harm White Pine 
Would Suffer If the Lease Were Terminated. 
The court concluded that, in the absence of relief, White Pine would suffer 
"substantial and irreparable harm." R. 1121. To the extent that the court was influenced 
by White Pine's assertion that it would lose its business unless relief were granted, R.592, 
that assertion, even accepted as true, fails to establish forfeiture of a type that can properly 
be considered as a factor militating in favor of relief. To the extent that the court's 
conclusion flowed from its observation that vacating the Utah Coal building would entail 
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a sacrifice by White Pine of both goodwill and its 1993 remodeling investment (R.1123), 
the record simply provides no support for the court's conclusion. 
As discussed above, nothing in Geisdorf suggests that a court should even consider 
or be influenced by the tenant's prospective loss. Even looking to the law of other 
jurisdictions, in which such consideration is permitted, the tenant must first satisfy the 
threshold determination of whether the tenant's conduct permits it to seek any relief at all -
i.e., a determination that the tenant made an "honest and justifiable mistake", as that test 
is properly interpreted and applied. See: Casa El Sol-Acapulco, SA. v. Fontenet, 919 
S.W.2d 709, 715 (Tex.App. 1996) (holding that before an optionee can seek equitable 
relief, it must first prove misconduct by the optionor or that its own failure was the result 
of an honest and justifiable mistake). See also: In re Millyard Restaurant, 110 B.R. 103 
(D.N.H. 1990). 
Once a non-performing tenant has fully satisfied this "eligibility" requirement, 
however, the authorities which do permit consideration of a tenant's prospective forfeiture, 
under various theories, make it clear that only certain types of anticipated losses fairly 
count. The forfeiture of the lease itself cannot count because the option is only an offer to 
renew the lease, and the consequences of failing to make an effective acceptance must fall 
on the optionee/offeree, and not upon the optionor/offeror. LX.L. Furniture Carpet 
Installment House v. Berets, 32 Utah 454, 91 P.2d 279, 283 (1907). See also: Bekins v. 
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Prudential Insurance Co., 176Cal.App.3d253,221 Cal.Rptr. 738 (1985); Western Savings 
Fund Society Of Philadelphia v. S.E.P.T.A., 285 Pa.Super. 187, 197, 427 A.2d 175 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1981); Western Tire, Inc. v. Skrede, 307 N.W.2d 558 (N.D. 1981); Simons v. 
Young, 93 Cal.App.3rd 170, 182, 155 Cal.Rptr. 460(1979); Roberts v. Canning, 1969 
Okla. 90, 455 P.2d 302, 305(1969). 
Thus, White Pine's principal argument concerning a prospective unconscionable and 
inequitable forfeiture - that it will not survive if it loses the benefit of the admittedly below-
market rent guaranteed upon a renewal of the Lease — is fundamentally flawed. In addition, 
its argument unfairly and unreasonably seeks to elevate White Pine's economic interests 
over those of Utah Coal, which, after all, owns the building which White Pine merely rents. 
More than one court has looked with disfavor on a similar effort by the tenant before it.19 
In addition, White Pine did not argue that it would sacrifice any goodwill merely by 
moving to a different location, contrary to the court's remark to that effect. Tr.53, R. 1123. 
Having operated successfully for seven years at another location before moving into the 
19E.g., Berkow v. Hammer, 189 Va. 489, 500, 53 S.E.2d 1 (1949); Koch v. H&S 
Development Co., 249 Miss. 590, 627, 629-630, 163 So.2d 710, 726-727 (1964); McClellan v. 
Ashley, 200 Va. 38, 40, 44, 104 S.E.2d 55 (1958); Simons v. Young, 93 Cal.App.3d 170, 
181n.3, 185n.5, 155 Cal.Rptr. 460 (1979); Western Savings, supra, 285 Pa.Super. at 197; 
Western Tire v. Skrede, 307 N.W.2d 558, 561 (N.D. 1981). None of the cases relied upon 
White Pine in support of its cross-motion suggests that a tenant's future survival, if deprived of 
the lease in question, was a factor in the decision to grant relief on the theory of equitable 
excuse. 
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Utah Coal building (CS Dep. 11-12, R.574-575, KS Dep. 109, R.253), and having operated 
in the Utah Coal building for five years (by now seven years), White Pine would be hard-
pressed to establish that its customer relationships would be ruptured in a town as small as 
Park City. At least one other court has looked with great skepticism on an argument by a 
well-known and distinguished business that relocation would pose any threat to that 
business's customer goodwill and position in its community. See Soho Development Corp. 
v. Dean & DeLuca, Inc., 517 N.Y.S.2d 498(App.Div. 1987). Nor is White Pine's business 
a uniquely "neighborhood" business. This fact distinguishes White Pine from the tenants 
in at least two of the cases cited by White Pine in support of its cross-motion: Fletcher v. 
Frisbee, 119 N.H. 555, 404 A.2d 1106(1979) (tenant operated a dry cleaner/laundromat), 
and Sosanie v. PernettiHolding Corp. ,115 N.J.Super. 409, 279 A.2d 904 (1971) (decision 
by a trial court involving a tenant who operated a neighborhood stationery-luncheonette). 
There is also no evidence in the record to support the notion that the Utah Coal building is 
somehow uniquely suited to White Pine's purposes, and no evidence which suggests that, 
apart from economics, White Pine could not operate its business elsewhere. 
White Pine argued that a denial of relief would result in its losing the $105,000 it 
spent in 1993 in connection with remodeling the Utah Coal building for its use. R.592. 
Both White Pine's argument and the trial court's finding in this regard Tr.53, R.1123, 
overlook the fact that, even if White Pine were to lose something if it had to leave the Utah 
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Coal building, the amount that it spent in 1993 is no measure of that loss. A number of 
courts, having evaluated the prospective "forfeiture" faced by a tenant which had made 
permanent improvements have made it clear that, at most, that loss amounts only to the 
unamortized or otherwise unrecouped value of such improvements.20 White Pine presented 
no evidence in support of its motion concerning what those values were as of 1999, when 
the cross-motions were made and decided. 
White Pine's attempt to argue an alleged unjust enrichment of Utah Coal by reason 
of the 1993 improvements is similarly misguided. R.582. The record contains no real 
evidence that Utah Coal will ultimately benefit to any significant extent from White Pine's 
1993 improvements, much less be "unjustly" enriched as a result of them. The Lease 
specifically contemplated that all of the permanent improvements would become the 
property of Utah Coal at the conclusion of White Pine's tenancy, whenever that might 
occur. Lease 18, R. 11-12. See, McClellan v. Ashley, supra, 104 S.E.2nd at 41-42 
20Aicken v. Ocean View Investments Co., Inc., 935 P.2d 992, 1001 (Haw. 1997) 
(improvements fully leveraged and tenant would remain liable on loans, mortgages); Duncan v. 
G.E.W., Inc., 526 A.2d 1358, 1359, 1364-1365 (D.C.App. 1987) (with landlord's knowledge, 
tenant secured a 5-year $400,000 loan for improvements, secured by the leasehold, within 6 
months of when notice of renewal was due); Fleming Cos., Inc. v. Equitable Life, 16 
Kan.App.2d 77, 818 P.2d 813, 819 (1991) (tenant would lose $1.8 million in unamortized 
improvements and about $3 million more in relocation expenses); Trollen v. City of Wabasha, 
287 N.W.2d 645,648 (Minn. 1979) (tenant had just entered into another lease for a parking 
area in reliance and would need at least 15 years to recoup his various investments); Soho 
Development Corp. v. Dean & DeLucca, Inc., 131 A.D.2d 385, 387, 517 N.Y.S.2d 498 
(App.Div. 1987) (improvements made at lease's inception, presumably amortized and 
depreciated over lease's life). 
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(although that lease provided for a partial "rebate" of certain improvement expenditures); 
Simons v. Young, supra, 93 Cal.App.3d. at 178-79 (neither the landlord's awareness of 
improvements nor the fact that improvements had been made established a right to relief). 
The analysis of the appellate court in Western Saving Fund, supra, is particularly 
instructive: 
The trial court had found that the lease obligated [tenant] to make various 
improvements in the premises. To that end, [tenant] apparently spent some 
$84,000. We note, however, that the lease agreement not only obligated 
[tenant] to make the improvements, but also stipulated that such 
improvements would become the property of the [landlord] at the termination 
of the lease. Thus, it would have been unreasonable for the [tenant] to have 
had an expectation of continued retention of such improvements for any 
period longer than strict compliance with the lease would permit. Having 
agreed to the lease, it's only reasonable expectation was that it would have the 
use of such improvements for [the initial lease term] and, assuming the option 
was timely exercised, for an additional . . . period. 
285 Pa. Super. 187, 191-92, n.3 (bolding in original; other emphasis added). 
C. The Trial Court Also Erred In Both Concluding and Finding That Utah Coal 
Suffers No Cognizable Prejudice As A Result of White Pine's Conduct. 
As with the question of White Pine's perspective forfeiture in the absence of relief, 
the trial court's treatment of the issue of Utah Coal's prejudice was deficient both as a 
matter of law and as a matter of the evidence. While the court was willing to consider 
White Pine's future detriment as an equitable factor, it declined to do the same for Utah 
Coal. The trial court allowed the 11-day interval between the closing of the notice window 
and White Pine's belated attempt to give effective notice to be characterized as a slight 
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delay that favored relief, even though the brevity of that period was indisputably attributable 
to Utah Coal. 
However, when it came to considering Utah Coal's possible prejudice if relief were 
not granted, the court below effectively used the "slight delay" against Utah Coal by finding 
that Utah Coal had not been prejudiced since it had not yet secured a new tenant. Given 
the sophistication of the current real estate market, it is wholly unreasonable to expect that 
a landlord can secure a new tenant for desirable premises without being able to give that 
new tenant assurance of occupancy on a date certain. Utah Coal had no opportunity to 
begin to secure a new tenant. The trial court's analysis was not a "balancing of the 
equities" at all. 
Equally as important, the trial court's view of this issue accorded no significance at 
all to the indisputable fact that, if the Lease is deemed to be renewed, Utah Coal will be 
forced to accept a below-market rent. Mr. Sturgis conceded as much when he testified that 
White Pine cannot afford to pay the rents being charged elsewhere in the Park City area. 
A number of courts that have denied equitable relief to tenants who failed to timely 
exercise options to renew have done so, at least in part, because the landlord would clearly 
be disadvantaged at least as much by a renewal as the tenant would be by a non-renewal of 
the lease in question. It is worth noting that a number of the cases cited by White Pine in 
support of its cross-motion were willing to grant relief because, among other grounds, the 
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landlord did not face the prospect of having to accept a below market rent if the lease were 
renewed. See: Wharf Restaurant, Inc. v. Port of Seattle, 605 P.2d 334 (Wash.App. 1979); 
Trollen v. City of Wabasha, 287 N.W.2d 645 (Minn. 1979); Fletcher v. Frisbee, 404 A.2d 
1106 (N.H. 1979). 
D. Thus, the Record does not Support the Judgment. 
As detailed above, the combination of the evidence and the trial court's analysis of 
that evidence, as reflected in its observations following oral argument, led to a ruling 
predicated on a succession of errors. White Pine never did explain why, or how, it wets 
unaware of its notice obligation. Nonetheless, because the court found White Pine's 
ignorance to have been genuine and because it accepted that White Pine had much to lose, 
the court reached for a result that reflected sympathy, but little even-handedness. It gave 
no account to the facts that it was Utah Coal's diligence that made White Pine's delay only 
"slight" and that Utah Coal stands to incur a substantial loss if the initial Lease is renewed. 
White Pine has only itself to blame for the unfortunate situation in which it has 
placed itself. This Court should be guided by the principle that, "'Hard cases must not be 
allowed to make bad equity any more than bad law.'" McClellan v. Ashley, 200 Va.38, 44 
104 S.E.2d 55 (1958)(citation omitted). Accordingly, on this ground as well, this Court 
should reverse the grant of summary judgment in favor of White Pine and direct the entry 
of judgment in favor of Utah Coal. 
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CONCLUSION 
The defense constructed by the trial court adopts the law of other jurisdictions 
without authority and reconstructs established Utah law on contracts. Utah law values 
predictability in enforcing contracts which reflect the intent of contracting parties. The trial 
court's new equitable exception is in direct conflict with that value, particularly under the 
circumstances of this case. The application of the exception turns the Lease upside down. 
The new defense that the trial court developed in this case is inconsistent with Utah law, 
and even if it were, is not justified under the circumstances of this case. Absent a reversal 
by this Court, the result reached by the trial court will obliterate the utility and reliability 
of renewal options in commercial leases. 
Dated this t? day of January, 2001. 
Janet A. Goldstein 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant Utah 
Coal, Inc. 
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SNELL & WILMER, L.L.P. 
Gateway Tower West 
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COAL AND LUMBER 
RESTAURANT, INC. 
Plaintiff and Counterclaim Defendant, 
vs. 
OUTDOOR ENDEAVORS UNLIMITED, 
INC., d/b/a WHITE PINE TOURING, 
Defendant and Counterclaimant. 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 980600256 
Honorable William A. Thorne 
The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiff and Counterclaim Defendant Utah 
Coal and Lumber Restaurant, Inc. ("UC&L"), and the Cross-Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment filed by Defendant and Counterclaimant Outdoor Endeavors Unlimited, Inc. d/b/a 
White Pine Touring ("White Pine") came before the Court for hearing on July 26, 1999. UC&L 
was represented by Bart J. Johnsen. White Pine was represented by Alan L. Sullivan. 
The Court, having reviewed the cross motions, the memoranda and affidavits in support of 
and in opposition to the cross motions, and having considered the arguments of counsel, and good 
cause appearing, concludes that there are no disputed issues of fact material to the relief requested 
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by White Pine, that White Pine is entitled to judgment as requested in its motion, that UC&L's 
motion should be denied, and that White Pine's motion should be granted. The Court further 
concludes as a matter of law: 
1. Under Utah law, strict compliance is the general rule for interpretation of an option 
to extend the terms of a lease agreement. 
2. The doctrine of equitable excuse is available under Utah law as an exception to the 
general rule requiring strict compliance. 
3. A mere mistake or forgetfulness on the part of a lessee is insufficient, by itself, to 
satisfy the requirements of the doctrine of equitable excuse. 
4. A landlord is not responsible for the forgetfulness of a tenant. 
5. White Pine's failure to timely exercise its option to extend the primary term of the 
lease was an honest and justifiable mistake. 
6. An honest and justifiable mistake, as referenced in the Utah case law on the 
subject, is defined in contrast to a mistake resulting from wilful conduct or gross negligence. 
7. White Pine's failure to timely exercise its option to extend was not the result of 
wilful conduct or gross negligence. 
8. In the context of the distractions faced by the principals of White Pine during the 
relevant time period, the Court concludes that White Pine's mistake in failing to timely exercise 
the option to extend was honest and justifiable. 
9. Although the 30-day default clause in the parties' Lease Agreement (May 16, 
1993) is not legally sufficient to excuse White Pine's failure to timely exercise the option to 
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extend, it does provide context for White Pine's conduct and supports the conclusion that White 
Pine's mistake was honest. 
10. White Pine's 11-day delay in exercising its option to extend was short. 
11. UC&L did not suffer any harm or prejudice as a result of White Pine's delay. 
UC&L did not change its position in reliance on White Pine's delay. UC&L did not attempt to 
sell or lease the premises to another tenant. Because UC&L did not change its position in any 
way, UC&L would not suffer any loss if the Court equitably excuses White Pine's delay. 
12. White Pine would suffer substantial and irreparable harm if its delay in exercising 
the option to extend were not equitably excused. 
13. White Pine invested a substantial amount of money for permanent improvements in 
the premises with the expectation that it would remain in the premises for the full 20 year 
extended term of the Lease Agreement. The loss of White Pine's monetary investment, its 
expectation that it would remain at that location for 20 years, and the loss of good will associated 
with operating its business at that location all factor into the harm that White Pine would suffer if 
its delay in exercising the option to extend is not equitably excused. 
14. Based upon the undisputed facts of this case, White Pine has met the requirements 
necessary to invoke the doctrine of equitable excuse. 
Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED 
AS FOLLOWS: 
1. The Complaint for Unlawful Detainer filed by UC&L is hereby dismissed with 
prejudice and on the merits. 
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2. Partial summary judgment is hereby entered in favor of White Pine for the relief 
sought in the First Cause of Action contained in its counterclaim and the Second Affirmative 
Defense contained in its answer. 
3. White Pine is equitably excused from strictly complying with the terms of the 
parties' Lease Agreement relating to extension of the primary term of the lease. 
4. The Court declares that White Pine has exercised its right to extend the terms of 
the parties' Lease Agreement and is entitled to possession, use, and quiet enjoyment of the 
premises for an extended term of five years beginning September 9, 1998, subject to the rental 
and other terms of the parties' Lease Agreement. 
5. White Pine has posted a cash counter-possession bond with the Clerk of the Court 
in the amount of $60,000 plus interest pursuant to this Court's order dated October 4, 1998. The 
Clerk of the Court is hereby directed to release the counter-possession bond with interest as 
follows: 
(a) The Clerk shall issue a check, payable to Utah Coal and Lumber 
Restaurant, Inc. and its attorneys, Richman & Richman, in the amount of $55,844.18, 
representing all of the amounts due to UC&L under the Lease Agreement for the period 
from September 1, 1998 through July 31, 1999. 
(b) The Clerk shall issue a check, payable to White Pine Touring, for the 
balance of the amount held by the Clerk for the counter-possession bond. 
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6. UC&L has posted a possession bond with the Clerk of the Court pursuant to this 
Court's order dated October 4, 1998. The Clerk of the Court is hereby directed to release the 
possession bond. 
7. The Court reserves the issue of entitlement to attorneys' fees and costs. 
DATED this (o day of ^ C i , 1999. 
COURT 
)VED AS TO FORM 
<4_ 
Williani A/Thorne 
ct^Hourt Judge .' 
r\\. 
Utah Coal and Lumber Restaurant, Inc. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the \y* day of-tedy, 1999,1 caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing [PROPOSED] PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT to be served, via United States 
mail, postage prepaid, on the following: 
Bart J Johnsen 
RICHMAN & RICHMAN 
60 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 




THIS LEASE AGREEMENT (this "Lease") is made and entered into this lh day of Aprft 
1993, by and between UTAH COAL & LUMBER RESTAURANT, INC., a Utah corporation, hereinafter 
called "Landlord," and OUTDOOR ENDEAVORS UNLIMITED, INC., a Utah corporation dba White 
Pine Touring, hereinafter called "Tenant." 
WITNESSETH 
In consideration of the covenants and agreements of the respective parties contained in this 
Lease and the mutual benefits to be derived therefrom, the parties agree as follows: 
DEMISED PREMISES 
On the terms and subject to the conditions set forth in this Lease, Landlord leases to Tenant, and 
Tenant rents from Landlord, those certain premises (the "Premises") consisting of approximately 4,712 
square feet on the main floor and lower level of the building commonly known as the "Utah Coal & 
Lumber Building" located at 201 Heber Avenue, Park City, Utah (the "Building"), as shown on the plot 
plan attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by this reference. The Building is a 
designated historical site and Tenant's occupancy must be conducted in a manner consistent with the 
preservation of the Building in accordance with the applicable rules and regulations. The Premises are 
contained within a site which is being further developed by Landlord and Landlord shall have the right to 
improve the surrounding Premises in a manner Landlord deems appropriate to facilitate fiiture 
development. 
The Premises are leased to Tenant for the primary term of five (5) years beginning on July 1, 
1993, provided that, if the necessary approvals for occupancy are not obtained from Park City prior to 
that date, the primary term shall commence on the earlier of the date occupancy is permitted by Park City 
or October 1, 1993 (the "Commencement Date"), and ending on the same date in the year 1998. To the 
extent that the primary term commences after July 1, 1993, but before October 1, 1993, the rent shall be 
prorated so that the Tenant pays only one-half of the applicable rent for the primary term (for example, 
$1,375 for one month.) Tenant shall have the right to extend the term of the lease for three (3) separate 
and additional consecutive periods of five (5) years each, which right shall be exercised by Tenant 
providing Landlord with written notice thereof not more than one hundred twenty (120) nor less than 
sixty (60) days prior to expiration of the primary or any extended term. Each such extended term shall 
be on the same terms and conditions as set forth herein, except that rent shall be adjusted as hereinafter 
provided. 
TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF LEASE 
This Lease is made on the following terms and conditions which are expressly agreed to by 
Landlord and Tenant: 
1. Rent. 
(a) During the first and second year of the primary term of this Lease, Tenant agrees 
to pay as rent to Landlord, at the address specified in this Lease or at such other place as 
nn* t 
Landlord may from time to time designate in writing, the sum of Thirty-Three Thousand 
Dollars ($33,000.00). During the third, fourth, and fifth year of the primary term of this 
Lease, the minimum rent shall be Fifty Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($50,500.00). 
All such sums to be paid in lawful money of the United States in equal monthly 
installments in advance, with the initial payment due on the Commencement Date, and 
subsequent payments due on the same day of each succeeding month during the term 
hereof. 
(b) During any extended five year term, the rent shall be the rent that was in effect at 
the end of the term then just ended multiplied by a fraction, the numerator of which is 
the Consumer Price Index as published by the United States Department of Labor for the 
last month of the then expiring term and the denominator of which is the Consumer Price 
Index for the first month of the then expiring term. For example, if the rent at the end of 
the fifth year is $55,500 per year, and the numerator of the Consumer Price Index is 110 
and the denominator is 100, the new rent for the succeeding term shall be $60,500. 
2. Security Deposit. Tenant hereby deposits with Landlord and shall maintain at all times 
on deposit with Landlord the sum of $2,750 as a security deposit for the faithful performance by Tenant 
of all terms and conditions of this Lease. Tenant may not designate any of the security deposit for 
payment of rent for any portion of the term of this Lease as the sum is to be held as security and to be 
returned only at the expiration of the Lease and the completion of all duties by Tenant. Landlord may 
but shall not be required to use or apply the security deposit to any payment of any amount due by 
Tenant or to cure any default by Tenant or for any loss or damage suffered by Landlord by reason of 
Tenant's default If any portion of the security deposit is so used, Landlord shall so notify Tenant and 
Tenant within ten (10) days shall deposit an amount sufficient to return the deposit to $2,750. Landlord 
shall not be require to keep the security deposit separate from any of its general funds and Tenant shall 
not be entitled to any interest on such security deposit. If Tenant has faithfully and fully performed all of 
the provisions, terms, and conditions of this Lease, upon its expiration Landlord shall return the security 
deposit to Tenant within there (30) days of the termination of this Lease. 
3. Authorized Use. Tenant shall have the right to use the Premises for the operation of a 
retail outlet selling sporting goods and equipment and for no other purpose whatsoever without the prior 
written consent of Landlord. 
4. Tenant to Insure Building. Tenant shall insure and keep insured the Building, including 
the Premises and any improvements thereto, against the perils of fire, lightning, and all other perils under 
an extended coverage hazard policy, relieving Landlord of any and all obligations of providing insurance 
as to the Premises and the activities there conducted. Insurance proceeds shall be made payable to 
Landlord and Tenant as their interests may appear and shall be in an amount sufficient to provide 
recovery in the event of loss of one hundred percent (100%) of the insurable replacement value of the 
Building, the Premises, and any improvements thereto. Such insurance shall be provided by a company 
or companies reasonably acceptable to Landlord and shall be procured and paid for by Tenant. Such 
insurance may, at Tenant's election, be carried under any general blanket insurance policy of Tenant; 
provided however, that a satisfactory certificate of the insurer evidencing insurance carried with proof of 
payment of the premium shall be deposited with Landlord. Each such policy shall contain a provision, 
endorsement, or similar agreement by the insurer that it will give Landlord at least thirty (30) days 
written notice before any such policy(ies) shall be altered or cancelled. 
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5. Condition of the Premises. Tenant accepts the Premises in the same condition they are 
in at the time of the signing of this Lease; provided that, Landlord agrees to pay, or to give Tenant a 
credit against rents due, for the cost of installation of a fire sprinkler system satisfactory to Park City; 
any structural improvements to the Building required by Park City to use the Premises as a retail outlet; 
cost of grading the lumber yard for drainage and utility, and fifty percent (50%) of the cost of installing a 
new heating system, either a gas forced air or a gas-fired boiler/radiant heat system. Tenant shall be 
responsible for all other remodeling and improvements necessary or desirable to use the Premises as a 
retail outlet. Tenant agrees that if Tenant changes the usual method of conducting Tenants business on 
the Premises, or should Tenant install thereon or therein any new facilities, ^ Tenant will, at the cost and 
expense of Tenant, make alterations or improvements in or to the Premises which may be required in 
accordance with any federal or state law, any municipal ordinance, or regulation applicable thereto. 
6. Repair and Care of Building and Premises bv Tenant. Tenant will not commit any waste 
of the Premises, nor shall it use or permit the use of the Premises in violation of any present or future law 
of the United States or of the state in which said Premises are located, or in violation of any municipal 
ordinance or regulation applicable thereto. Other than as specifically assumed by Landlord in paragraph 
6, Tenant agrees to keep the interior and the exterior of the Building, the improvements on the Premises, 
and the grounds in good condition and repair, including all labor, materials, and other repairs to the 
electrical fixtures, plumbing, appliances, air conditioning, and heating systems (including spring and fall 
servicing, as recommended by the manufacturer, and replacement of filters as necessary); the removal of 
snow, mowing of grass, care of shrubs, general yard maintenance, and landscaping; and the cleaning and 
painting of the interior and exterior of the Building as may be necessary in order to maintain the 
Building, Premises, and surrounding area in a clean, attractive, and sanitary condition. Tenant shall keep 
the driveways and sidewalks, if any, reasonably free from ice and snow and assume all other obligations 
of repair and maintenance of the Premises as required. 
7. Exterior of Building. Landlord agrees to maintain the roof, foundation, and exterior 
walls of the Building, except painting of the exterior walls which shall be maintained by Tenant and 
except for any maintenance that may be required as a result of the act or negligence of Tenant or Tenant 
improvements. Landlord shall not, however, be obligated to repair any such damage until written notice 
of the need of repair shall have been given to Landlord by Tenant, and after such notice is so given, 
Landlord shall have a reasonable time in which to make such repairs. 
Landlord agrees that if in an emergency it shall become necessary to perform any maintenance or 
make any repairs hereby required to be made by Landlord and Landlord cannot be located by telephone, 
Tenant may, at its option, have the maintenance or repairs made and pay the cost thereof and, in such 
event, Landlord agrees to reimburse Tenant therefor upon demand, or, if not so reimbursed, Tenant may 
deduct the amount so expended by it from the rent or other sums due Landlord from Tenant. 
8. Alteration of Building and Installation of Fixtures and Other Appurtenances. Tenant 
may, subject to the prior written consent of Landlord, said consent not to be unreasonably withheld or 
delayed, but at Tenant's own cost and expense, and in a good and workmanlike manner, make such 
alterations and repairs in the Building as Tenant may require for the conduct of its business without, 
however, materially altering the basic character or appearance of the Building or improvements, or 
weakening the structure of the Building. Tenant shall appropriately dispose of items removed or 
replaced in such renovation. In addition, Tenant shall have the right, without the permission of Landlord, 
to erect, at Tenant's sole cost and expense, such temporary partitions as may be necessary or desirable to 
facilitate the handling of Tenant's business and to install electrical fixtures, shelves, trade fixtures, 
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additional lights, and wiring. Any alterations, improvements, or fixtures made or added to the Building, 
including permanent partitions, all electrical fixtures, lights, and wiring, shall be installed in 
conformance with applicable laws and ordinances and shall, at the election of Landlord, become the 
property of Landlord at the expiration or sooner termination of this Lease. Should Landlord request 
Tenant to remove all or any part of the above-mentioned items, Tenant shall do so prior to the expiration 
of this Lease and repair the Premises as described below. Shelves, temporary partitions, blinds, trade 
fixtures, and appliances installed by Tenant shall remain the property of Tenant and may be removed by 
Tenant at any time; provided, however, that all covenants, including rent, due hereunder to Landlord 
shall have been complied with and paid. At the expiration or sooner termination of this Lease or any 
extension thereof, Tenant shall remove said shelves, temporary partitions, blinds, and appliances, and 
repair, in a good and workmanlike manner, all damage done to the Premises by such removal. Tenant 
shall not exercise the right and privilege granted by this paragraph 7 in such manner as to damage or 
affect the structural qualities of the Building. 
9. Parking. Tenant shall have the right to share (no exclusive rights to any parking) in any 
onsite parking that may exist on the property owned by Landlord on which the Building is located. 
Landlord shall have no obligation to repair, plow for snow, or otherwise maintain the parking area. 
10. Payment of Taxes and Other Assessments. 
(a) Tenant shall pay all Property Taxes, license fees, and assessments levied or 
imposed against the Premises and Building during the term of this Lease or any 
extension thereof by any federal, state, municipal, or other governmental authority. 
"Property taxes" shall mean all taxes, assessments, levies, and charges, whether special, 
extraordinary, or otherwise, whether foreseen or unforeseen, which may be levied, 
assessed, or imposed upon, on account of or with respect to the ownership of and/or all 
other taxable interests in the Premises or Building. Should the taxing authorities include 
in such Property Taxes the value of any improvements made by Tenant or include 
machinery, equipment, fixtures, inventory, or other personal property of Tenant, then 
Tenant shall also pay the entire Property Taxes for such items. A tax. bill submitted by 
Landlord to Tenant shall be conclusive evidence of the amount of taxes assessed or 
levied as well as the items taxed. Tenant shall provide to Landlord evidence of payment 
of such Property Taxes prior to delinquency. Property Taxes for the 1993 year shall be 
prorated based on the number of months from the Commencement Date through the end 
of the year. The property tax assessment for the Premises and Building is currently 
included in the taxes for a larger parcel owned by Landlord. Landlord and Tenant agree 
that the tax attributable to the Premises and Building currently equals twenty percent 
(20%) of the tax on the total parcel. In the event that Landlord sells a portion of the 
parcel or constructs additional improvements that change the amount of tax levied, the 
tax base for the Premises and Building shall be considered unchanged for the remaining 
current term of this Lease and thereafter shall be based on an appraisal of the Premises 
and Building. The percentage of Tenant's portion of the tax attributable to the Premises 
and Building shall be increased 10% for each option term exercised by Tenant. 
(b) Tenant shall also be solely responsible for and shall pay before delinquent all 
municipal, county, state, or federal taxes assessed during the term of this Lease against 
any personal property of any kind, owned by or placed in, upon, or around the Premises 
by Tenant. No law or practice postponing the payment of such taxes, assessments, or 
charges until after the termination of this Lease shall relieve Tenant of the obligation to 
make such payments that would otherwise be due and payable during the term hereof. 
Payment of property taxes shall be made by Tenant to Landlord not later than thirty (30) 
days following the date on which Landlord provides Tenant with written notice. 
(c) If Tenant fails to pay any of such taxes, charges, or other impositions when due, 
Landlord may pay the same, receive immediate reimbursement from Tenant, and 
thereafter Tenant shall pay one-twelfth of Tenant's portion of the estimated Property 
Taxes each month in advance on the first day of each month with its payment of monthly 
rental. The amount of Property Taxes upon which such payment is to be based shall be 
the most current notice(s) of assessment or tax bill(s) concerning the Premises or, if there 
is none, such amount as Landlord may reasonably estimate. If the amount paid by 
Tenant toward property taxes exceeds the amount actually due (as determined from the 
notice(s) of assessment or tax bill(s) actually covering the period in question), the excess 
shall be credited to Tenant's next succeeding payment(s) pursuant to this subsection. If 
the amount paid by Tenant is less than the actual amount due, Tenant shall pay to 
Landlord the deficiency within ten (10) days after written notice from Landlord. 
Anything herein to the contrary notwithstanding, if Tenant deems excessive or illegal 
any such tax or assessment and the amount thereof is contested by Tenant in good faith, 
Tenant shall furnish to Landlord a bond or other security in form and substance 
reasonably satisfactory to Landlord in an amount equal to the amount of taxes or 
assessments so contested, which bond or security shall guarantee the payment thereof 
with interests and penalties thereon. 
11. Erection and Removal of Signs. Tenant may place suitable signs on the Premises for the 
purpose of indicating the nature of the business carried on by Tenant in said Premises; provided, 
however, that such signs shall conform to local laws and ordinances and be in keeping with other signs in 
the district where the Premises are located; and provided, further, that the location and size of such signs 
shall be compatible with the appearance of the Building and shall not damage the Premises in any 
manner that cannot be reasonably restored. 
12. Glass. Tenant agrees to immediately replace all glass on the Premises which is broken 
or damaged during the term of this Lease with glass of the same quality as that broken or damaged. 
13. Right of Entry bv Landlord. Tenant at any time during this Lease term shall, upon 
request by Landlord, permit inspection of the Premises, whether during Tenant's regular business hours 
or otherwise, and upon reasonable prior notice, by Landlord or Landlord's agents or representatives for 
the purpose of ascertaining the condition of the Premises and in order that Landlord may make such 
repairs as may be required to be made by Landlord under the terms of this Lease. S]x^60}daysprior 
to the expiration of this Lease^Landlord may post suitable notice on the Premises that the same are Tor 
Rent" and may sfiow the Premises to prospective tenants at reasonable times and upon reasonable.prior 
notice. .Landlord may not, however, thereby unnecessarily interfere with the use of the Premises by 
Tenant 
14. Payment of Utilities. Tenant shall pay all charges, including, but not limited to, charges 
for water, sewer, gas, electricity, refuse collection, and other utilities used on the Premises. 
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15. Assignment and Sublease. Tenant shall not have the right to assign its interest under the 
Lease or sublease the Premises without the prior written consent of Landlord. It is understood and 
agreed that any permitted assignment or sublease shall in no way relieve Tenant from primary 
responsibility to Landlord under this Lease. Any such assignment or sublease is subject to the agreement 
of the assignee(s) or sublessors) to be bound by all of the terms and conditions of this Lease. A sale of a 
majority interest in the Tenant shall be deemed to be an assignment and subject to the provisions of this 
paragraph. 
16. Damage or Destruction: Waiver of Subrogation. If the Premises or any part thereof shall 
damaged or destroyed by fire, flood, or other casualty, and unless otherwise specifically provided below, 
Landlord shall promptly repair all such damage and restore the Premises to the extent that the proceeds 
of insurance as provided by Tenant are sufficient to do so, subject to reasonable delays due to 
adjustments of insurance claims, strikes, and all other causes (such as timing constraints, and third-party 
approvals beyond Landlord's reasonable control). Landlord and Tenant hereby release each other from 
responsibility for loss or damage occurring on or to the Premises or to the contents thereof, caused by 
fire or other hazards, to the extent covered by the extended coverage hazard insurance then in effect, and 
each waives all rights of recovery against the other for such loss or damage. Willful misconduct lawfully 
attributable to either party, whether in whole or in part a contributing cause of the casualty giving rise to 
the loss or damage, shall not be excused under the foregoing release and waiver. 
If the Premises are so damaged or destroyed and Landlord fails to repair the same as required, 
Tenant may terminate this Lease effective as of the date of such damage or destruction by giving notice 
thereof to Landlord unless Landlord shall, after notice thereof from Tenant (which notice may be in 
person or by telephone), immediately take all necessary emergency action so that the Premises can be 
utilized for Tenant's normal business purposes with a minimum of disruption and, thereafter, Landlord, 
as expeditiously as possible and in any event within seven (7) days from the date tenant's notice is given, 
commences removal of the debris and restoration of the Premises. If, notwithstanding such damage or 
destruction, Tenant's business on the premise remains open for business, Landlord's restoration and 
repair shall be completed as soon as reasonably feasible and in any event no later than thirty (30) days 
from the date Tenant's notice is given to Landlord. If the Premises are so damaged or destroyed that in 
the reasonable opinion of Tenant they cannot be used for Tenant's business operations and Landlord 
cannot reasonably be expected to complete restoration and repair of the Premises within one hundred 
twenty (120) days from the date of such damage or destruction, Tenant shall have the absolute right to 
terminate this Lease upon notice thereof to Landlord. 
In the event of any termination of this Lease pursuant to this article, Tenant shall consent to the 
release of any insurance proceeds applicable to the Building and Premises. Rent shall be paid to the 
effective date of termination but not thereafter, and Tenant shall be entitled to a refund of any rent paid 
for any period after such date. 
17. Condemnation. In the event that the Premises or any part thereof shall be condemned for 
public use, then, and in that event, upon the vesting of title to the same for such public use, Tenant shall 
have the right to terminate this Lease, anything herein contained to the contrary notwithstanding, except 
that Tenant shall have the right to prove and pursue against the condemning authority the value of 
Tenant's leasehold interest, the trade fixtures installed by it, moving expenses, and other special 
damages. In the event of such termination of this Lease, all rent paid in advance shall be apportioned as 
of the date of such termination. Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this paragraph, in the event 
that only a part of the Premises shall be so taken and the part not so taken shall, in Tenant's reasonable 
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judgment, be sufficient for the continuing operation of tenant's business, tenant shall retain the part not 
so taken and there shall be a proportional reduction in the rent. 
18. Injuries and Property Damage. Tenant agrees to indemnify and hold harmless Landlord 
of and from any and all claims of any kind or nature arising from Tenant*s use of the Premises during the 
term hereof, and Tenant hereby waives all claims against Landlord for damage to goods, wares, or 
merchandise or for injury to persons in and upon the Premises from any cause whatsoever, except such 
as might result from the gross negligence or willfiil misconduct of Landlord or Landlord's representatives 
or from failure of Landlord to perform its obligation hereunder within a reasonable time after notice in 
writing by Tenant requiring such performance by Landlord. Tenant shall at all times during the term 
hereof keep in effect, in responsible companies, liability insurance in the names of and for the benefit of 
Tenant and Landlord with limits as follows: 
Bodily Injury $ 500,000 each person 
$ 500,000 each accident 
Property Damage $ 100,000 
or a "combined single limit" (covering bodily injury liability and property damage) of not less than One 
Million Dollars ($1,000,000.00). Such insurance may, at Tenant's election, be carried under any general 
blanket coverage of Tenant. A renewal policy shall be procured not less than ten (10) days prior to the 
expiration of any policy. A satisfactory certificate of the insurer evidencing insurance carried with, proof 
of payment of the premium shall be deposited with Landlord. Tenant shall have the right to settle and 
adjust all liability claims and all claims against the insurance companies, but without subjecting Landlord 
to any liability or obligation. Each such policy shall contain a provision, endorsement, or similar 
agreement by the insurer that it will give Landlord at least ten (10) days written notice before any such 
policy(ies) shall be altered or cancelled. 
19. Surrender of Premises. Tenant agrees to surrender the Premises at the expiration or 
sooner termination of this Lease or any extension thereof, broom-clean in the same condition as when 
said Premises were delivered to Tenant, as altered pursuant to the provisions of this Lease, ordinary 
wear, tear, and damage by fire, the elements, and other casualty excepted. If Tenant elects to remove any 
items of its property from the Premises, it shall repair any damage caused by the removal thereof, which 
shall not include repainting or redecorating. If within twenty (20) days after Tenant vacates the property, 
Tenant fails to remove its personal property and fixtures the same shall be deemed abandoned and shall 
become the property of Landlord. 
*£z 20. Holdover. Should Tenant hold over the Premises or any part hereof after the expiration 
of the term of this Lease, unless otherwise agreed in writing, such holding over shall constitute an 
unlawful detainer, and Tenant shall be subject to a claim for damages as provided under the Utah 
unlawful detainer statutes; provided
 thowever, if such holdover is pursuant to the express written consent 
of Landlord, said holdover shall constitute a tenancy from month-to-month only, and Tenant shall pay as 
monthly rental the then reasonable value of the use and occupation of the Premises which shall not be 
less than the rent to be paid for the last month under this Lease. 
21. Quiet Enjoyment. If and as long as Tenant pays the rents reserved by this Lease and 
performs and observes all the covenants and provisions hereof, Tenant shall quietly enjoy the Premises, 
subject, however, to the terms of this Lease, and Landlord will warrant and defend Tenant in the 
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enjoyment and peaceful possession of the Premises throughout the term of this Lease and any extensions 
and renewals thereof. 
22. Landlord's Title. Landlord covenants that Landlord has good and marketable title to the 
Premises, subject only to encumbrances described on Exhibit "B," with full right and authority to grant 
the estate demised herein and to execute and perform all of the terms and conditions of this Lease. 
Landlord shall timely and fully perform and comply with each and every term, covenant, and condition 
of each mortgage, deed of trust, or other lien, claim, or encumbrance on the Premises, created or suffered 
to exist by it. 
On the date of this Lease and as of a date no later than the commencement of the original term of 
this Lease, Landlord covenants that the Premises are subject to no leases or tenancies and the Premises 
are subject to no restrictions, agreements, violations, mortgages, encumbrances, liens, easements, or 
defects in title of any nature whatsoever other than those specifically set forth in Exhibit "B" attached 
hereto and by reference made a part hereof. Landlord further covenants that as of a date no later than the 
commencement of the original term of this Lease, the Premises are subject to no zoning or other 
restrictions which would prohibit the use of the Premises for the operations proposed by Tenant (if not 
prohibited by law and if Tenant obtains all necessary licenses at Tenant's expense). 
23. Waiver of Covenants. It is agreed that the waiving of any of the covenants of this Lease 
by either party shall be limited to the particular instance and shall not be deemed to waive any other 
breaches of such covenant or any provisions herein contained. 
24. Events of Default. The following shall be "events of default" under this Lease and the 
terms "event of default" or "default" shall mean, whenever they are used in this Lease, any one or more 
of the following events. 
(a) Failure by Tenant to pay or cause to be paid the rent herein required to be paid within a 
period often (10) days after said payment is due. 
(b) Failure by Tenant or Landlord to observe and perform any other covenant, condition, or 
agreement on its part to be observed or performed for a period of thirty (30) days after written 
notice given to the party at fault by the other party hereto, specifying such failure and requesting 
that it be remedied, unless said covenant, condition, or agreement requires more than thirty (30) 
days to observe or perform, in which case the party at fault shall have a reasonable time to observe 
or perform so long as the party at fault shall begin to observe or perform within said thirty (30) 
day period and diligently pursue the observation or performance of the covenant, condition, or 
agreement to its completion. 
25. Remedies of Default. 
(a) Whenever any event of default by Tenant shall have happened and be 
continuing, subject to the laws of the state of Utah, Landlord may take any one or more 
of the following remedial steps after giving Tenant an additional thirty' (30) days written 
notice if the event of default is still then continuing: 
(i) Re-enter and take possession of the Premises without terminating this 
Lease and sublease the Premises for the account of Tenant, holding Tenant liable 
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for the difference in the rent and other amounts payable by the sublessee, 
including all reasonable costs and expenses of such subleasing and the rents and 
other amounts payable by Tenant hereunder. 
(ii) Terminate the lease term, exclude Tenant from possession of the 
Premises, and use its best efforts to lease the Premises to another party for the 
account of Tenant, holding Tenant liable for all rent and other amounts due 
under this Lease and not paid by such other party as well as all reasonable costs 
and expenses in leasing the Premises to another party. 
(iii) Take whatever action at law or in equity may appear necessary or 
desirable to collect the rent then due and thereafter to become due, or to enforce 
performance and observance of any obligation, agreement, or covenant of 
Tenant under this Lease. 
(iv) Make performance for Tenant and for that purpose, advance such 
amounts as may be necessary. Any amounts so advanced or any expense 
incurred or sum of money paid by reason of the failure to comply with any 
covenant, agreement, obligation, or provisions of this Lease or in defending any 
action by reason of any such failure for any reason shall be deemed to be 
additional rent. The acceptance by Landlord of any installment of fixed rent or 
of any additional rent hereunder shall not be a waiver of any other rent then due. 
(v) Terminate this Lease by giving Tenant notice of such termination and, 
thereupon, this Lease shall expire as fully and completely as if that day were the 
date definitely fixed for the expiration of the term of this Lease, and Tenant shall 
then quit and surrender the Premises. 
(b) Whenever any event of default by Landlord shall have happened and be 
continuing, Tenant may take any one or more of the following remedial steps after 
giving Landlord an additional thirty (30) days written notice if the event of default is still 
continuing: 
(i) Take whatever action at law or in equity may appear necessary or 
desirable to enforce performance and observance of any obligation, agreement, 
or covenant of Landlord under this Lease. 
(ii) Make performance for Landlord and for that purpose, advance such 
amounts as may be necessary. Any amounts so advanced or any expense 
incurred or sum of money paid by reason of the failure to comply with any 
covenant, agreement, obligation, or provisions of this Lease or in defending any 
action by reason of any such failure for any reason may be recovered from 
Landlord upon demand and, if necessary, may be offset against the monthly 
rental payable by Tenant in an amount to be mutually determined by Landlord 
and Tenant. 
No remedy herein conferred upon or reserved to Landlord or Tenant is intended to be exclusive 
of any other available remedy or remedies, but each and every such remedy shall be cumulative and shall 
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be in addition to every other remedy given under this Lease now or hereafter existing at law or in equity 
or by statute. No delay or omission to exercise any right or power accruing upon any default shall impair 
any such right or power or shall be construed to be a waiver thereof, but any such right and power may 
be exercised from time to time and as often as may be deemed expedient. 
26. Involuntary Actions Against Tenant If the Premises or any part thereof shall be 
abandoned, if Tenant shall be dismissed therefrom by or under any authority other than Landlord, if the 
leasehold estate created hereby shall be taken on execution or by any process of law, or if Tenant shall 
admit in writing its inability to pay its obligations generally as they become due, then Landlord may, at 
its option, terminate this Lease, and Landlord or Landlord's agents and servants may immediately, or at 
any time thereafter, re-enter the Premises by force, summary proceedings, or otherwise., and remove all 
persons and property therein, without being liable to indictment, prosecution, or damage therefor. 
Landlord may in addition to any other remedy provided by law or permitted herein, at its option, relet 
upon reasonable terms and conditions said Premises on behalf of Tenant, applying any moneys collected 
first to the payment of expenses of reassuming or obtaining possession, second to the payment of costs of 
placing the Premises in rentable condition, including leasing commission, and third to the payment of 
rent due hereunder and any other charges due to Landlord. Any surplus remaining thereafter shall be 
paid to Tenant, and Tenant shall remain liable for any deficiency in rental which shall be paid upon 
demand therefor to Landlord. 
27. Enforcement. In the event either party shall enforce the terms of this Lease by suit or 
otherwise, the party at fault shall pay the costs and expenses incident thereto, including reasonable 
attorneys' fees. 
28. Past Due Sums. If Tenant or Landlord fails to pay, within ten (10) days after the same is 
due and payable, any rent, or other amounts required to be paid hereunder, such unpaid amounts shall 
bear interest from the due date of payment at a variable rate equal to five (5) percentage points over the 
rate published in The Wall Street Journal, as the prime rate, which is the base rate on corporate loans at 
large United States money center commercial banks, as adjusted from time to time while the amount 
remains unpaid, but in no event less than fifteen percent (15%) per annum. Notwithstanding the 
foregoing, however, Tenant's or Landlord's right concerning such interest shall be limited by the 
maximum amount which may properly be charged for such purposes under applicable law. 
29. Failure to Perform Covenant. Any failure on the part of either party to this Lease to 
perform any obligation hereunder and any delay in doing any act required hereby shall be excused if such 
failure or delay is caused by any strike, lockout, governmental restriction, or any other similar cause 
beyond the reasonable control of the party so failing to perform, to the extent and for the period that such 
cause continues, save and except that the provisions of this paragraph shall not excuse nonpayment of 
rent or other sums due hereunder on its due date. 
30. Rights of Successors and Assigns. The covenants and agreements contained in this 
Lease shall apply to, inure to the benefit of, and be binding upon the parties hereto, their permitted 
assigns and their respective successors in interest. 
31. Time. Time is of the essence of this Lease and every term, covenant, and condition 
herein contained. 
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32. Lkns. Should any mechanic's or other lien be filed against the Premises or any part 
thereof by reason of Tenant's acts or omission or because of a claim against Tenant, Tenant shall cause 
the same to be cancelled and discharged of record by bond or otherwise within ten (10) days after written 
notice by Landlord unless the lien is being contested by Tenant in good faith in which case the above 
time period shall not begin to run until the matter is finally resolved against Tenant 
33. Laws. Waste. Nuisance. Tenant covenants that it: 
(a) will comply with all governmental laws, ordinances, regulations, and 
requirements, now in force or which hereafter may be in force, of any lawful 
governmental body or authorities having jurisdiction over the Premises; 
(b) will keep the Premises and every part thereof in a clean, neat, and orderly 
condition, free of objectionable noise, odors, or nuisances, and will in all respects and at 
all times fully comply with all health and police regulations; and 
(c) shall not suffer, permit, or commit any waste. 
34. Construction of Lease. The word "Landlord" as used herein shall refer to the individual, 
individuals, partnership, or corporation called "Landlord" at the commencement of this Lease, and the 
word "Tenant" shall likewise refer to the individual, individuals, partnership, or corporation called 
"Tenant." Words of any gender used in this Lease shall be held to include any other gender, and words 
in the singular number shall be held in include the plural when the sense requires. 
35. Paragraph Headings. The paragraph headings as to the contents of particular paragraphs 
herein are inserted only for convenience and are in no way to be construed as part of such paragraph or 
as a limitation of the scope of the particular paragraph to which they refer. 
36. No Broker. No broker or other person has been instrumental in introducing the parties to 
this Lease or in negotiating any term hereof, except Resort Realty Group which is entitled to a 
commission payable by the Landlord. 
37. Notices. It is agreed that the legal address of the parties for all notices required or 
permitted to be given hereunder, or for all purposes of billing, process, correspondence, and any other 
legal purposes whatsoever, shall be deemed sufficient, if given by a communication in writing by 
personal service, as defined in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, or United States mail, postage prepaid 
and certified, return receipt requested, and addressed as follows (or such other address as Landlord or 
Tenant shall specify in writing to the other): 
If to Landlord, to: Utah Coal & Lumber Restaurant, Inc. 
Attn: Nick Powell 
P.O. Box 682323 
Park City, Utah 84068 
If to Tenant, to: Outdoor Endeavors Unlimited, Inc. 
dba White Pine Touring 
Attn: Charles Sturgis 
P.O. Box 680393 
- 1 1 - 0004 
Park City, Utah 84068 
Notice shall be deemed to have been given on the date said notice is received by Landlord or Tenant 
hereunder. 
38. Mortgage by Landlord- Tenant enters into and accepts this Lease and the leasehold 
interest and estate of Tenant hereunder subject and subordinate to any existing or future mortgages, 
deeds of trust, or other transfers of Landlord's interests. Any subordination shall be effective only upon 
receipt of written notice from the Landlord setting forth the date of the mortgage or deed of trust and the 
name of the party holding such mortgage or deed of trust. 
39. Sale of Leased Premises- Notwithstanding paragraph 38 above, in the event Landlord 
shall sell (rather than mortgage or encumber) these Premises or the Building to a third party, Landlord 
agrees that any such sale shall be subject to this Lease and Tenant's rights hereunder shall not be deemed 
cancelled or terminated. 
40. First Right of Refiisal. In the event that Landlord is selling the Building apart from the 
property the Building is located on which is being separately developed, then Landlord hereby grants 
Tenant a right of first refusal to purchase the Building as follows: 
(a) Prior to completing a sale to bonafide third party, Landlord shall notify Tenant 
of its intention to sell and the proposed price and terms of such sale in its entirety deleting the 
name of the proposed purchaser. Upon receipt of such notice, Tenant shall have a period of 
thirty (30) days in which to notify Landlord in writing that it wishes to purchase the Building at 
the proposed price and terms and in connection therewith delivering such cash, down payments 
and mortgages and such other terms of payment, including closing dates, as are set forth in the 
written notice. 
(b) In the event that Tenant fails to notify Landlord of its wish to exercise its first 
right of refusal and complete such purchase, Landlord may then sell the Building to such third 
party as it deems appropriate. 
(c) In the event the Tenant fails to purchase the Building any one time pursuant to 
this first right of refusal, whether by failure to elect or complete such a purchase and the 
Landlord completes its sale to a third party, this first right of refusal shall terminate and Tenant 
shall be entitled to negotiate its own arrangements with the new owner. 
(d) In the event the Tenant fails to complete a purchase of the Building pursuant to 
this first right of refusal, but Landlord fails to complete its sale to a bonafide third party, then 
Tenant shall retain its right of first refusal on subsequent sales by the Landlord. 
(e) Sales of corporate stock of the Landlord shall not be deemed to l>e a sale of the 
Building or Premises and shall not be subject to the provisions of this paragraph. 
41. Entire Agreement. This Lease is and shall be considered to be the only agreement or 
understanding between the parties hereto. All negotiations and oral agreements acceptable to both 
parties have been incorporated herein. This Lease may not be amended or modified by any act or 
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conduct of the parties or by oral agreement, unless reduced to writing and signed by. the party to be 
charged therewith. If any provision of this Lease is declared invalid in a court proceeding between the 
parties hereto, such invalidity shall not invalidate this Lease, and this Lease shall be construed as if the 
invalid part were not contained herein, and the rights and obligations of the parties shall be construed and 
enforced accordingly. 
42. Possession. Landlord shall deliver to Tenant possession of the Premises 
contemporaneously with the execution hereof. 
43. No Partnership. Landlord does not by this Lease, in any way or for any purpose, become 
a partner or joint venturer of Tenant in the conduct of its business or otherwise. 
44. Landlord's Right for Future Development. Landlord expressly reserves the right to 
develop the surrounding or adjacent premises in any manner which it deems appropriate and Tenant 
waives any right it may have for any compensation or off-set by reason of such development. Tenant 
acknowledges that Landlord has plans to further develop property held by Landlord that is contiguous to 
the Premises and in so doing may alter, modify, or add to the Building and construct other improvements 
on land adjoining the Building provided that, delivery access to either the north or east side of the 
Building shall be preserved in any future development. Such construction shall be conducted by 
Landlord, to the extent reasonably practicable, to minimize interference with Tenant's use of the 
Premises, including reasonable notice as to the schedule of all construction, but Tenant acknowledges 
that such construction may interfere with such use and hereby waives any right to offset or decrease the 
rent due to Landlord under the terms of this Lease as a result of any such interference. 
45. Provisions Binding. Etc. Except as otherwise provided, all provisions herein shall be 
binding upon and shall inure to the benefit of the parties, their legal representatives, heirs, successors, 
and assigns. Each provision to be performed by either party shall be construed to be both a covenant and 
a condition. 
46. Environmental Hazards and Indemnifications. Landlord acknowledges that it has not 
received notice that there are any hazardous toxic wastes or hazardous substances, hereinafter 
collectively referred to as "Environmental Materials", present or stored on the Premises or adjacent 
parcel, except that Landlord is aware that there is an old buried gas tank on the adjacent property which 
has to date not caused any problem with Environmental Materials. Landlord agrees that it shall be 
responsible for any clean-up required by reason of Environmental Materials found on the Premises in its 
current state and shall further be responsible for any problems created by Environmental Materials in 
Landlord's future development of adjacent Premises. Landlord shall hold Tenant harmless and 
indemnify Tenant from any damage, cost, or injury which may be occasioned by such Environmental 
Materials, except those occasioned by Tenant's use of the Premises. Tenant hereby covenants that it will 
use the Premises in a manner which will not create any problem with Environmental Materials, including 
but not limited to transportation, storage or disposal, and Tenant shall indemnify Landlord from any 
damage, cost, or injury which may be occasioned by such Environmental Materials, except those 
occasioned by Landlord's use of the Premises. 
- i **- n r% A n 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have caused these presents to be executed as of the 
date first above written. 
Landlord: 
UTAH COAL & LUMBER RESTAURANT, 
INC. 
By_ ^^z 
Duly Authorize^; Officer 
Tenant: 
OUTDOOR ENDEAVORS UNLIMITED, INC. 
dba White Pine Touring 
Duly Authorized Officer/ 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COAL AND LUMBER 
RESTAURANT, ORIGINAL 
P l a i n t i f f , 
vs. 
OUTDOOR ENDEAVORS 
UNLIMITED, INC, et al, 
Case No. 980600256 
Defendant . 
B y - . 
FILED 
JUL - 3 2000 
Third District Court 
Deputy Clerk, Summit Com iftty 
BEFORE: 
Hearing 
E l e c t r o n i c a l l y Recorded on 
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THE HONORABLE WILLIAM A. THORNE 
Third District Court Judge 
For the Plaintiff: Bart Johnson 
RICHMAN & RICHMAN 
60 South 600 East #100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Telephone: (801)532-8844 
For the Defendant: Todd Shauqhnessv 
Alan Sullivan 
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Transcribed by: Beverly Lowe RPR/CSR/CCT 
1771 SOUTH CALIFORNIA AVENUE 
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1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 (Electronically recorded on July 26, 1999) 
3 THE CfOURT: Case No. 980600256, Utah Coal vs. Outdoor 
4 Endeavors. Counsel, if you'd each make an appearance so the 
5 record is complete. 
6 MR. JpHNSON: My name is Bart Johnson for Utah Coal 
7 and Lumber. 
8 MR. SpLLIVAN: Good morning, your Honor, Alan Sullivan 
9 for Outdoor Endeavors. 
10 THE C0URT: It is cross motions for summary judgment. 
11 Counsel, are yd>u ready to go? 
12 MR. JOHNSON: Yes, your Honor. 
13 THE CC))URT: Okay. 
14 MR. J0HNSON: It's somewhat of a paper intensive case. 
15 THE CCJURT: I noticed. 
16 MR. JOHNSON: I saw when we brought in the books that 
17 we (inaudible) weeks ago, and I'm sure that your Honor has had 
18 a chance to review those. Would it be helpful at all, your 
19 Honor, if I went over a few of the facts, or do you prefer— 
20 THE COtJRT: If there is something particular — I know 
21 that they were ll days late in reviewing or giving notice 
22 (inaudible) to Extend the lease, and they had invested $100,000 
23 into the remodeling. 
24 MR. JOHNSON: Your Honor, realistically the facts are 




























previously the parties entered into a lease, and your Honor has 
read the lease which is attached as Exhibit A to our memorandum 
in support of our motion for summary judgment. 
On the first page of the lease the lease set forward 
the primary term, which was a five-year term — primary term 
for five years beginning on July 1, 1993. It granted within 
the lease a right to extend the term of the lease for three 
separate and additional consecutive periods of five years, 
which rights shall be exercised by tenant providing landlord 
with written notice thereof not more than 120 days nor less 
than 60 days prior the expiration of the primary or any 
extended term. 
As such, your Honor, lessees — defendants in this 
action — had a 60-day window in which to provide written 
notice of their intention to renew the lease to the landlord. 
It's undisputed that during that period they did not provide 
any written notice of their intent to exercise their option. 
Subsequent to the expiration of the option period 
counsel for Utah Coal and Lumber corresponded with defendants 
and indicated that because the option period had expired the 
lease would expire on its terms on September 9th. In response 
to that defendant then sent what they entitled or alleged was 
notice of intent to renew. It's undisputed that that renewal 
was not within that 120 to 60-day window. 
So there's these myriad of issues for your Honor to 
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1 decide; however, none of them are fact related. There are some 
2 disputed facts here and there. As Mr. Sullivan points out, 
3 none of them 4re material to the issues that are before the 
4 Court. 
5 In sijmmary, the issues that are before the Court is 
6 one, did they Istrictly comply with the lease provision and 
7 exercise their! option. Two, if they did not, is there a 
8 supervening exbusing instance that allows the Court to 
9 disregard the specific language of the lease or three, in the 
10 event there is not and based upon Outdoor Endeavor's arguments 
11 where they are asking the Court to do what they entitle equity, 
12 are there equitable bases on which to forgive them for not 
13 complying with the specific terms of the option renewal period. 
14 So I'4 like to go through those in that direction. I 
15 don't believe it's disputed that they failed to exercise or 
16 failed to strictly comply with the provisions of the lease in 
17 exercising theijr option. They did not provide any written 
18 notice to the ljandlord within that 60-day window, and their 
19 alleged written! notice was only in response to the indication 
20 by the landlord^  that the lease would expire. 
21 There's no question that Utah Coal and Lumber had no 
22 obligation whatsoever to remind Outdoor Endeavors of their 
23 legal responsibilities in exercising their option. The lease 
24 contract was an arm's length transaction, it was specifically 
25 negotiated over a long time period, and the option renewal 
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period was set forth on the first page of the lease. Each 
party had a copy of the lease. 
As the Supreme Court set forward in the Diesdorf vs. 
Dody case, which is a seminal case in Utah on the lease 
provision option, unless there is a waiver, supervening 
excusing instance, the Court has no choice but to require 
strict compliance. So strict compliance is in, is the state of 
law in Utah. Strict compliance is not the law in Hawaii, and 
it might not be the law in Kansas, but it's the law in Utah. 
Now within the Diesdorf case the Supreme Court says 
that there are instances which deviation from strict compliance 
may be equitable excused. The first is exigent circumstances 
beyond the parties' control. Outdoor Endeavors has alleged no 
exigent circumstances. I don't believe they're going to allege 
any today. 
The second is some instances in which an optioning may 
be excused from strict compliance include when the optionee's 
conduct in failing to comply was not due to willful or gross 
negligence on the part of the optionee, but was rather the 
result of an honest and justifiable mistake, and for that 
proposition the Utah Supreme Court cites a Texas case entitled 
Cattle Feeders Incorporated vs. Jordan. 
The third way of excusing strict compliance is where 
the strict compliance was prevented by some act of the 
optionor, such as waiver or misleading representations or 
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conduct. The^ re have been no allegations by Outdoor Endeavors 
that there is waiver or misleading representation on behalf of 
Utah Coal and Lumber. 
The $upreme Court summarizes by saying, MIn the 
absence of sortie such supervening, comma, excusing instance, 
comma, this C0urt has no choice but to require strict 
compliance witlh the terms of the lease agreement." The reason 
I included the punctuation, your Honor, is I believe it's 
important to d|ifferentiate that, because it does not say some 
supervening or1 excusing instance; supervening, comma, excusing 
instance. 
So the argument, then, that has been presented by 
Outdoor Endeavors within their briefs is that the state of the 
law is not that it is a supervening excusing instance, but that 
there is equitable excuse, and for that they rely on the cited 
portion of the Cattle Feeders vs. Jordan Texas case, "The 
conduct was not due to willful or gross negligence on the part 
of the optioned, but was rather the result of an honest and 
justifiable mistake." 
Withir}. their reply memorandum Outdoor Endeavors 
indicates that |it is undisputed that White Pine's failure to 
give notice was an honest and justifiable mistake. However, 
that is not entirely accurate. 
Within the memorandum for summary judgment filed by 
us, on page 11 begins in subsection (3), "There exists no facts 
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to support an allegation of justifiable mistake to excuse VThite 
Pine from strict compliance." The summary of that argument is, 
your Honor, they forgot to exercise their option. Ms. Sturgis 
testified, "I honestly just missed it. We were busy doing 
other things, wearing other hats." The situation we have here 
is that the alleged honest and justifiable mistake is we were 
busy doing other things and we missed it, we forgot. 
Your Honor, the defendant here wants this Court to do 
something that's irregular. By that I mean that in the United 
States we favor ownership of property. Utah Coal and Lumber 
owns the property. Outdoor Endeavors, dba White Pine, entered 
into a lease agreement five years previously that gave them a 
leasehold estate in that land. Within that lease, within that 
contract, was a provision for renewal. It was an option to 
renew. 
That option expired when the lessee did not renew 
according to the terms. What they ask this Court to do is 
somehow rewrite that contract, divesting Utah Coal and Lumber 
of their right to control, to contract and to deal with their 
property, with they ownership rights in that property. 
White Pine would ask this Court to rewrite the terms 
of the lease that are unfair to them, but leave in place the 
terms of the lease that are unfair to the property owner. The 
Court should decline that invitation. 
The lessee only has the rights in that property based 
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1 upon the contractual provisions. When that contract expires 
2 they no longet have any rights. Their argument focuses on it's 
3 not fair, we ^pent money, we should get to stay there. But 
4 those arguments are red herrings, your Honor. The situation is 
5 that in Utah ye have a stricter standard than some of the other 
6 cases cited byt Outdoor Endeavors. Outdoor Endeavors wants this 
7 Court to create a new body of law, to adopt a test set forward 
8 in Fletcher vs. Frisbee, which is from New Hampshire, that the 
9 Supreme Court does not adopt. 
10 If th^ Court makes a determination that equitable 
11 excuse can exifet in Utah, the Supreme Court in Diesdorf set out 
12 the test. It's not willful or gross negligence but rather the 
13 result of an honest and justifiable mistake. The Court didn't 
14 say that we're going to look at how long the delay was, the 
15 hardship to th0 lessee, whether or not there's prejudice to the 
16 landlord. The Court doesn't adopt the test from New Hampshire 
17 as set forth Lr\ Fletcher vs. Frisbee. The Court says honest 
18 and justifiable mistake. 
19 Now it's important to digress here for an 
20 understanding otf the status of the law in Utah the reason that 
21 there are no cakes on equitable excusal is because it really 
22 doesn't exist. There is equity, the Court can do equity. It's 
23 undisputed that the Court has the inherent power to do equity. 
24 But that doesn't create a new cause of action or a new claim on 
25 the basis that tye don't think it's fair for us to get treated 
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like that, so we're coming to the Court to ask for equity. 
But equity aids the vigilant, and these people were 
not vigilant. There's no dispute that it was not some sort of 
willful or egregious conduct. They forgot, they were busy 
doing other things. 
The case of IXL Furniture vs. Berretts from 1907 in 
the Supreme Court of Utah sets forward that "Strict compliance 
with option provisions is required in Utah. Notice must be 
given and notice must be given pursuant to the terms of the 
option provision." It's telling that the Court goes on to say, 
"The courts have no right to regard any provision" — excuse 
me, "no right to disregard any provision of a contract or to 
save rights that are lost thereunder through the act of the 
party asking relief, unless it is made to appear that it would 
be unconscionable or clearly inequitable to do or not to do." 
The Court goes on to say, "Appellant pleads nothing 
that would have prevented it from making the request at the 
proper time except mere, inadvertence." In that case the Court 
found against the lessee. 
The IXL case, even though it is 90 years old, 
continues to be cited by cases around the United States in 
support of the proposition that equity aids the vigilant, and 
that a party should not be excused — should not be granted 
relief because of its own negligence and its own failure. 
The Diesdorf case continues with the process or the 
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1 thinking that in Utah we have somewhat of a stricter standard 
2 for failure t<|> exercise an option. So if the Court makes a 
3 determination that we have a stricter standard, then Outdoor 
4 Endeavors' cl^im fails as a matter of law. If the Court makes 
5 a determination that in Utah we do have some equitable etxcuse, 
6 the Court cannot adopt Outdoor Endeavor's claimed test as set 
7 forth in the ^ letcher vs. Frisbee case, because that has not 
8 been adopted b^ Utah, and the Supreme Court did not set forth 
9 that test. Th^y only cited Cattle Feeders vs. Jordan, and they 
10 only set forward the language that said honest and justifiable 
11 mistake. 
12 Another Texas case called Reynolds Penlan Company vs. 
13 Hexter and Lob^llo, which is kind of a hotly disputed case, the 
14 majority found that the Court shouldn't have the ability to go 
15 in and rewrite the contracts. The dissent said it's not fair, 
16 we need to have equity. Other Texas courts have gone with the 
17 dissent. So evfen though this case was not overruled because it 
18 was of a lower jurisdiction, it does call in to question its 
19 applicability as to that analysis. 
20 Howeve^ :, undisputed is that on the motion for 
21 rehearing the appellant in that matter said that they contend 
22 that "The trial court erred because the question of its failure 
23 to timely exercise its option constituted an honest and 
24 justifiable mistake was a question for the trier of fact 3:ather 
25 than a matter tliat can be determined by the Court on summary 
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1 judgment. We cannot agree. These ultimate determinations 
2 which trigger the interposition of equity are made by the 
3 Court, not the jury. The question of whether equity ought to 
4 intervene must be determined by the Court based upon all of the 
5 circumstances of the case and the principle of equity with 
6 which a jury is not presumed to be familiar." 
7 Your Honor has the legal ability, then, to make a 
8 determination as to whether or not their claimed excuse 
9 constitutes honest and justifiable mistake. 
10 Now the claimed expenses are a red herring. They 
11 really don't have anything to do with this matter. The parties 
12 negotiated for Outdoor Endeavors to move into this building. 
13 Outdoor Endeavors went in there expecting to remodel the 
14 premises. The building had been used as a restaurant for 
15 years. Now they wanted to use it as a retail outlet. They 
16 went in with plans, they went in with knowledge that they were 
17 going to spend money. The lease does not require them to spend 
18 money, but the lease sets forth that they will be obligated to 
19 pay all the expenses surrounding the remodeling of the 
20 building. 
21 They voluntarily and knowingly entered into this lease 
22 agreement at a time that they knew how much or a good idea of 
23 how much they would have to spend, and they knew about the 
24 problems that they alleged appeared after the lease because 
25 they were provided with the architect's report a week prior to 
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entering into the lease. So they had full knowledge that they 
would have to spend money, and they spent the money prior to 
moving in. Sc)> it's disingenuous for them to say, "Wellr we 
spent such an4 such amount of money, therefore we should get to 
stay." But wliat they didn't do by spending that money was buy 
the property. 
They spent the money pursuant to the contract that was 
entered into knowingly by business people. So your Honor, we 
would encourage you to not consider the issue of the money 
because it's a red herring, and two, the law, even if you are 
to take this Cattle Feeders case, does not set forward the 
hardship to the lessee. It focuses merely on the acts that 
prevented the lessee from exercising its option. 
It's Undisputed, your Honor, that in this spring of 
1998 Ms. Sturgis retrieved a copy of the lease, she took the 
lease to her accountant and said to him, "Please calculate how 
much the rent is going to increase because our initial five-
year term is going to be up." The accountant said, "Let's do 
it later." Ms. Sturgis testified that she read the lease at 
that time. She| also said, "Did I go over it with a fine tooth 
comb, no." 
So on the front page the first provision as to the 
renewal provisions, Ms. Sturgis did not inform herself of her 
rights or her obligations under that contract. Is that an 
honest and justifiable mistake? 
10 
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The second allegation that they make is that they were 
busy doing other things, they were negotiating for a lease on 
the golf course for the cross country ski run, and they were 
wearing a lot of other hats, and that they had a dog die. 
Although each of those can be time consuming, none of them 
seemed to be — seemed to eliminate their ability for a 60-day 
window to write a quick note to Mr. Powell that says, "We 
exercise our option to renew." 
They don't make any allegation that they were 
prevented from doing that, only that they forgot. Ms. Sturgis 
testified that she honestly missed it. She used the term, 
"honestly," and that's been extrapolated, then, to be that it's 
undisputed that it was the result of an honest and justifiable 
mistake. 
Certainly justifiable is a defined term. In Black's 
Law Dictionary justifiable is defined as "Rightful, defensible, 
warranted or sanctioned by law, that which can be shown to be 
sustained by law." I forgot to inform myself of my obligations 
under that contract is not justifiable. Ms. Sturgis, Mr. 
Sturgis' honesty is not in question here. There is no 
allegation that they are dishonest in any way, but they did not 
exercise their option to renew, they did not do what they were 
contractually obligated to do, and the terms of the lease 
expired on its face. There is nothing there to be revived. 
In IXL, the 1907 case, the Court indicated that when 
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1 the option expires it no longer exists and cannot be revived. 
2 Somewhere it Says that. There is no forfeiture because there's 
3 nothing to forfeit. They have no ownership interest anymore. 
4 So this is not a situation where Utah Coal is asking the Court 
5 to take away something from them, Utah Coal is merely saying, 
6 "You did not buy what you bargained for, and we don't have to 
7 give it to yoi}," and that's what they want us to do. They want 
8 us to just givle them a new property interest without 
9 negotiation, Without compensation, without consideration, and 
10 they're asking! the Court to blaze new law in spite of the 
11 language of Dibsdorf. 
12 Their attempt to differentiate the facts in Diesdorf 
13 is ineffectiveI In that situation the plaintiff, who was the 
14 lessee, had purchased from the defendant her business, wrote 
15 her a check, b\jit she still owned the building, and so sh€* 
16 leased to him. He did not exercise his option to renew. The 
17 language in th^ir option — it's almost identical to the 
18 language in this option. 
19 Mr. Dijesdorf indicated, "This is to confirm my oral 
20 notice to exercise ray option." Ms. Dody rejected that as being 
21 untimely, and the Supreme Court agreed. It was not timely. 
22 The Supreme Court then set forward that the optionee must 
23 exercise his opjtion unconditionally and precisely according to 
24 the terms of thfc option. 
25 The Cotirt then ruled that Mr. Diesdorf could not stay 
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1 in the building, he had not exercised his option. Substantial 
2 compliance doesn't apply in Utah unless there is waiver or 
3 supervening excusing instance, and the Court requires strict 
4 compliance. 
5 The Supreme Court concludes the Diesdorf case by 
6 saying, "We uphold the rule of law that barring special 
7 circumstances such as misrepresentation or waiver, exercise of 
8 an option must be made strictly in accordance with its terms." 
9 That's unequivocal. Strict compliance is the law in Utah. 
10 Now the Court has inherently its equitable powers, but 
11 in this case the Court should decline to use those equitable 
12 powers by making a determination one, that if there is 
13 equitable excuse only in Utah it is limited to honest and 
14 justifiable mistake, and two, in this instance that is not an 
15 honest and justifiable mistake. It was merely inadvertence, 
16 forgetfulness or negligence. 
17 In the ALR that was attached by respondent, there is a 
18 discussion of a number of cases both ways. One says equity is 
19 available, others say equity is not available. In that 
20 situation or in that treatise they say under the subsection, 
21 "Forgetfulness, inadvertence or oversight, equitable relief is 
22 available in a certain number of cases." Most of them are from 
23 the back east. 
24 It's interesting, I went through each of those and 
25 took a look at what the reasoning for each one was, and the 
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bottom line w^s that it was hardship to the lessee, and the 
Court focused on the hardship to the lessee. Each one had some 
sort of different circumstance. There was one where the lessee 
had provided the attorney — their attorney with a copy of the 
lease and tolcjl them in a timely way, "Exercise this option," 
and the attorney failed to do it. The Court said, "Well, it's 
real hardship, it's going to cost you a lot of money to move." 
But "dhe cases that focus on equitable relief not 
available, whibh are an equal number if not a great number, 
focus on the contractual provisions, and then they look at does 
equity apply iji this instance? It's interesting that each case 
in the equitable relief not available that deals with it has 
something somewhat consistent. The lessee testified that he 
just plain plurdb forgot. They didn't remember. The Court 
denied relief t}o lessee who threw sheer forgetfulness failed to 
give timely notice exercising an option. 
These leases all are consistent in that the only 
situation, the bnly reason for failure to exercise its option 
was that they forgot, and that's what we have here. 
So the Court can make a decision that says considering 
the equities in this matter they're not entitled to the relief 
they seek because they just forgot. It was their negligence. 
They were not prevented in any way. The Court should not adopt 
an expansive equitable excusal analysis as encouraged by White 
Pine from cases that have not been cited by the Supreme Court, 
i 
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1 not relied on by the Supreme Court, and the Court should 
2 consider that the law in Hawaii is going to be different than 
3 the law in Utah. Their property rights law is completely 
4 different than ours. They couldn't own property for the 
5 longest time, they could only lease it, so of course there's 
6 going to be more forgiveness because it would divest most 
7 people from their property rights. 
8 It's important that your Honor not be swayed by any 
9 argument that this is a hypertechnical or mumbo jumbo as in 
10 Diesdorf that the plaintiff asserted. This is basic 
11 contractual law. They purchased an option, they failed to 
12 exercise their option, the option expired. 
13 Your Honor, I would like to reserve some time for 
14 rebuttal after Mr. Sullivan. 
15 THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Sullivan. 
16 MR. SULLIVAN: Thank you, your Honor. Let me put this 
17 in a little context procedurally, your Honor. We have a cross 
18 motion for summary judgment as the Court noted at the 
19 beginning. Our motion for summary judgment attacks the 
20 complaint for unlawful detainer in the case, and also addresses 
21 our first cause of action in our counterclaim, which is a 
22 counterclaim that because of the — based upon the doctrine of 
23 equitable excuse, the Court should hold that the additional 
24 five-year term began at the end of the initial five-year term 
25 of the lease. Mere images, in essence, between the plaintiff's 
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complaint and our first cause of action. 
Neither Mr. Johnson's motion for summary judgment nor 
our motion fox* summary judgment addresses the other two claims 
in our counterclaim. One is for breach of contract and one is 
for unjust enrichment. So we're not talking about those 
counterclaims here today. 
The dourt really put his finger on the dispute, we're 
talking about an 11 day delay here, and we are talking — what 
we ask the Cou^ rt to do is to exercise what we believe are his 
unquestionable equitable powers to excuse an 11 day delay. 
The Sjturgises poured their savings into the building. 
They transformed the building into an attractive retail store. 
They spent this money in the expectation and based upon the 
expectation th^t they would be in the building for 20 years. 
If the Court declines to excuse this delay the Sturgises will 
lose their investment, they will lose the entirety of their 
good will at tt^ at location. 
Conversely, Utah Coal and Lumber, if the Court agrees 
with Mr. Johnson, Utah Coal and Lumber will reap a windfall. 
It will lease tjhe building to someone else probably for a lot 
more money, and for years it will benefit precisely because the 
Sturgises spent a lot of money in the expectation that they, 
not somebody elpe, will be there for 20 years. 
With ofre important exception, your Honor, relating to 
the amount of Utah Coal and Lumber's alleged damages, with that 
m 
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important exception, there are no disputed issues of material 
fact. In fact, we think the case really turns on a single 
question of law, and that question is does the Court have 
authority to excuse a brief delay in the exercise of an option 
to extend the term of the lease, under the circumstances of 
this case is the doctrine of equitable excuse the law in Utah, 
Your Honor, let me just — I know the Court has read 
our materials, but I think it may be helpful to provide the 
Court with a brief chronology that will give the Court maybe a 
little background than it has read. I'll provide a copy of 
this to counsel. 
The parties signed the lease on May 16, 1993. It's 
important to know that the building that we're talking about — 
and I'm sure the Court has driven past the Utah Coal and Lumber 
building at the foot of Main Street. For about six or seven 
months up to May of 1993 that building was for lease or for 
sale. There was a sign out front and Utah Coal and Lumber 
people were having a difficult time in getting anybody to lease 
the building. It was in basically a construction zone at the 
foot of Main Street. 
It was not nearly desirable at that time, as the 
Sturgis' then location — they had been in business for about 
10 years up to that point in the middle of Main Street, up Main 
Street, as White Pine Touring. Therefore, it was with some 
trepidation and risk that they went to the base of Main Street 
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because it wajs basically a construction zone at that point in 
time. 
The building was in a state of complete disrepair. 
The bottom flpor of the building was totally unusable really 
for anything. A portion of the upper floor was unusable. It 
was certainly not suited for a — as a retail outlet. 
Whit£ Pine began its renovations right on the day that 
the lease was signed. Mr. Johnson said something that I think 
is incorrect. White Pine certainly knew that it would have to 
make renovations, there was no question about that, but it 
wasn't until t|he lease was signed — we're talking about three 
weeks after the lease was signed that they received from the 
architect, Petjer (inaudible) a copy of the report from the 
structural engineer that said that not only will you have to 
renovate to make the place suitable as a retail outlet, but 
there are majot structural problems with the building. The 
roof supports are bad and there are a whole host of structural 
problems that Vere discussed. 
It is true, as Mr. Johnson says, that the report from 
the structural engineer predated the lease, it was dated like 
May 4, May 6, Something like that, but it is also undisputed 
from the fax signature at the top of the page that it was sent 
to the architect and to us well after the lease was signed. 
It really doesn't matter, your Honor, I submit. If 
that's a disputed issue of fact it's not material. The fact is 
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that early on in the process of renovation the Sturgises found 
out that they had much more to do than they had believed was 
necessary, and some of it were things that had to be done just 
to get into the building, just to pass zoning code to get into 
the building. 
The first day of business of August 26, 1993, but they 
were still actually moving in. As a matter of fact they were 
doing renovations up until mid-October. September 9, 1993 is 
the date upon which the certificate of permanent occupancy was 
issued, and according to Utah Coal and Lumber that was the 
commencement date of the lease. If the Court has read the 
lease the Court knows from the first page it basically says 
that the commencement of the lease shall be July 1, 1993 unless 
the certificate of occupancy is not then — had not yet been 
issued, and it hadn't been. 
But if the certificate of occupancy is issued later 
than July 1 then the date of commencement for the lease will be 
the earlier of the issuance date of the certificate or October 
1. 
Now the interesting thing is, your Honor, is that back 
in 1993 nobody knew when the certificate of occupancy had been 
issued because nobody got it. I mean it wasn't sent to 
anybody, it was sitting in a file in Park City Municipal 
Corporation offices, and it's undisputed that both the Powells, 
Utah Coal and Lumber and the Sturgises didn't know when it had 
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been issued, ^nd they just assumed that sometime in October it 
had been issued and they proceeded with their lives as if 
everything wa^ okay. 
It wasn't until May or June of 1998 that Mr. Powell 
went to the Peirk City offices, found a copy of the certificate 
of occupancy spid found that it had been issued on September 9, 
1993. 
We aslsume for purposes of these motions that the 
commencement date of the lease was September 9th, that's when 
the certificate was issued, and therefore that the ending date 
was the same d&te of 1998, the initial five-year term. 
According to Utah Coal and Lumber, therefore, the 
window — the $0-day window between which the — during which 
the notice to Extend occurred was between May 13th and July 
11th, 1998. 
I nee4 to say this, your Honor, during this entire 
period of time in May of 1993 until September of 1998, that 
entire five-yea^: time, the Sturgises were model tenants, there 
is no question jabout that. They didn't miss a rent payment, 
they got along Vith t h e landlord, they paid for things that 
they didn't have to pay for. Their view was that they were in 
this deal for the long term, they wanted to maintain peace with 
the Powells, th^y wanted to do everything because this was 
their livelihood This was their business, this is the only 
way they make mc^ ney in the world, and they had poured all of 
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their savings into this building, and they didn't want it to go 
away. 
So July 15, 1998, I'm going to talk about justifiable 
mistake and honest mistake in a moment, but just to conclude 
the chronology, on July 15, 1998, four days after the close of 
this window during which notice was to be given, Mr. Johnson on 
behalf of Utah Coal and Lumber mailed notice of expiration of 
the lease to a PO box that the Sturgises don't own. 
That letter finally got to them, it is undisputed, on 
July 22 of 1998. On that same day the Sturgises hired a 
lawyer, and on that same day the lawyer sent a letter to Mr. 
Johnson saying, "We hereby exercise the option." So that is 
the chronology that we're dealing with. 
Your Honor, there are four facts that form a really 
crucial part of the background here that I just want to mention 
to the Court, and I want to mention in some detail. 
The first of those four facts is that between May and 
October of 1993 the Sturgises incurred over $148,000 in moving 
into the Utah Coal and Lumber building. Some of that was just 
for moving, some of it was for movable trade fixtures, but some 
of it — a very significant portion of that — was for 
permanent improvements of the kind that I've mentioned before, 
structural types of permanent improvements and other types of 
permanent improvements. 
We presented undisputed evidence that the Sturgises 
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spent $105,00|0 in permanent improvements that will be there if 
they leave, ahd that benefitted the building in a permanent 
sort of way. There were architectural and structural 
engineering services that were rendered, new wiring — all of 
the wiring in the building had to be replaced, new structural 
components, replacement of all the plumbing in the building, 
build out of the lower floor of the building for commercial 
retail use and for office space, the installation of new public 
bathrooms throughout the building, new doors and windows, new 
sidewalk and hew heating system, all of this was paid totalling 
$105,000 by the Sturgises. 
Now, your Honor, the Sturgises are not rich pecple. 
To a lot of people $105,000 is not a lot of money. To the 
Sturgises it is and it was. It was their livelihood, it is 
their only income, and this was an investment that they made 
because they believed that they would be in this building for 
20 years, and they would not have made that investment unless 
they had believed that they were going to be there for the long 
term. So that^s fact number one. 
Fact tiumber two, Utah Coal and Lumber, as well as the 
Sturgises, anticipated and believed that the Sturgises would 
exercise their option and would occupy the building for 20 
years. We know that because that has been testimony, your 
Honor. We kno\^  that because during the negotiation of the 
lease back in ][993 the Sturgises told the Powells, both Jim 
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Powell and Nick Powell, that they wanted a long-term lease, 
that they wanted a 20 year lease. It was divided up into five 
separate sections, option sections, to provide for adjustment 
of the rents that they, the Sturgises, believed and expressed 
their belief that they needed to be in this space for the long 
term. 
In the spring of — in late 1997 and early 1998 Utah 
Coal and Lumber had an appraisal of the property done, and in 
that appraisal, which they received, it indicated that the 
Sturgises would be in the property for 20 years. That was the 
assumption upon which all parties were operating. 
In a conversation that occurred in May of 1998, Mr. 
Powell testified that with Charlie Sturgis. Mr. Powell 
testified that he understood at the end of that conversation 
that the Sturgises intended to exercise their option to trigger 
a new five-year term. He understood that, there was no 
question in anybody's mind that that was the intent, and we 
believe that the Court needs to understand that fact in the 
context of exercising its equitable powers. So that's fact 
number two. 
Fact number three, your Honor, and this is extremely 
important, the 11 day delay in giving notice to extend was not 
the result of gross negligence, nor was it the result of any 
willfulness, but was simple and justifiable inadvertence. 
As Mr. Johnson said, early in the spring of 1998 Kathy 
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1 Sturgis took phe lease and went to White Pine's accountants and 
2 said, "How do we figure out this lease escalation, the rent 
3 escalation, when the lease — the initial five-year term 
4 expires and w£ have a new five-year term," because there has to 
5 be a new rental rate based upon a consumer price index in the 
6 months preceding the end of the initial five-year term.. The 
7 accountant said, "It's too early to do that, put the lease 
8 away, let's worry about it a little bit later." And your 
9 Honor, after t)iat time they just forgot about it, they just 
10 forgot about i£. 
11 During the summer of 1998 Charlie and Kathy Sturgis 
12 were in a series of intense negotiations with the City of Park 
13 City concerning a White Pine touring tour track around the Park 
14 City Municipal Golf Course. It's a concession that the 
15 Sturgises had oVned for a number of years. Park City was 
16 threatening to take it away, they were involved in 
17 negotiations, t^ hat is part of their livelihood, it is part of 
18 the White Pine touring business, and that was a matter of 
19 considerable stress. It took them away from the office quite a 
20 bit. 
21 At that same time there was a particular valued 
22 employee of hire, the chief hire, who quit. The Sturgises are 
23 the parents of ^ daughter who was two years old at the time who 
24 was having some problems with the death of a dog, it was a 
25 traumatic experience. 
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1 In the background, your Honor, there were two 
2 additional facts. One of those facts was they didn't really 
3 know when the last day of the end of the initial five-year term 
4 would be and when the anniversary date of the lease was. The 
5 date July 1 is in the lease, the date October 1 is in the 
6 lease, and then it mentions whenever the certificate of 
7 permanent occupancy would be issued, but they really didn't 
8 have a clear idea of when that was, but they thought it was in 
9 the timeframe of September/October. 
10 In addition to that, your Honor, they had — and this 
11 is undisputed — they had been told by their lawyer back in 
12 1993 that the 30 day grace period in the lease that applies to 
13 defaults would apply to a situation where they failed to 
14 exercise an option. In other words, they thought that they 
15 would get a notice and that they would have 30 days to cure 
16 that. We're not taking that position in this lawsuit right 
17 now, your Honor, because we don't think it's the right position 
18 to take, but that's what the Sturgises believed, that's what 
19 they had in the back of their mind, a sort of fail safe if they 
20 should miss a date anyway or be in the default under the lease. 
21 So these are the factors that work together, and the 
22 result is as Kathy Sturgis testified, "I just missed it, I just 
23 missed it." So that's the third fact. 
24 The fourth fact, your Honor, is that the 11 day delay 
25 did not result in prejudice to Utah Coal and Lumber. It did 
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not matter. I took Mr. Nick Powell's deposition, I asked him 
what harm hag Utah Coal and Lumber suffered as a result solely 
of that 11 da[y delay, I asked him, "Did you make any effort to 
lease the premises, did you enter into a lease with somebody 
else, did you try to sell the property during that 11 day 
period, did you make a contract to sell the property, did you 
change your position in any way during that 11 day period such 
that the exercise of equity would prejudice these foiksr" and 
the answer wa$ no. 
Now, your Honor, let's talk about the law, beceiuse 
that's really where this case comes down to. Let me tell you 
what the case is not about. This is not a case about 
substantial cqmpliance, the doctrine of substantial compliance. 
That is not the law of Utah, the Utah Supreme Court has 
rejected that and we're not arguing as the tenant did in the 
Diesdorf case that we substantially complied with the lease. 
We did not, an^ substantial compliance is not the law in Utah, 
strict compliance is the law. 
This is not a case about waiver. We're not claiming 
as did the tenant in the Diesdorf case that Utah Coal and 
Lumber did anything to waive their right to the notice. This 
is a case about the doctrine of equitable excuse. I believe, 
your Honor, thcit there is really not a serious argument about 
whether the Sti^ rgis' conduct and the other facts of the case 
comply with the! doctrine of equitable excuse as it's been 
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1 developed all over the country. 
2 Rather, the argument that we need to deal with, your 
3 Honor, is Mr. Johnson's argument that Utah has taken a 
4 different path from the rest of the country, that under Utah 
5 law if the lessee misses an extension deadline through simple 
6 inadvertence, misses it by a week, by a month, by a day, the 
7 Court is not allowed to excuse that inadvertence. 
8 Mr. Johnson said it here today and he said it in his 
9 reply brief, "The defense of equitable excuse is not recognized 
10 in Utah. Rather the law in Utah is strict compliance with an 
11 option provision, absent an intervening excusing instance." 
12 That is somebody else's fault, somebody else's fault. We 
13 respectfully submit that this is not the law of Utah. 
14 The Diesdorf case, the Utah Supreme Court said, "There 
15 are instances in which deviation from strict compliance with 
16 lease extension provisions may be equitably excused. Some 
17 instances in which an optionee may be excused from strict 
18 compliance include when the optionee's conduct in failing to 
19 comply was not deemed to willful or gross negligence on the 
20 part of the optionee but was rather the result of an honest and 
21 justifiable mistake." 
22 The important thing about this, your Honor, is that 
23 the Court explicitly adopts the doctrine of equitable excuse, 
24 which is a term of art that has been used by courts all over 
25 the country. It's also important to note that the Court did 
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not — in Dielsdorf did not purport to have an exhaustive list 
of the requirements or the elements of equitable excuse because 
it hadn't even been argued in that case. There was no evidence 
relating to the doctrine of equitable excuse. There was no 
effort to sho\|* any expenditures that had been made by the 
lessee or the reasons for the failure to comply with the* notice 
requirement ir^  that case. So it's a nonexclusive list of the 
circumstances under which the Court has the authority to 
equitably excuse. 
It's (also important to note that our Utah Supreme 
Court in this case makes in (inaudible) position that dichotomy 
is between willful or gross negligence on the one hand and 
honest and justifiable mistake. It doesn't talk about the 
conduct of somebody else that's being the cause of all of this, 
the supervening cause. 
Mr. Johnson is right, as support for Diesdorf vs. — 
for this language in Diesdorf and for the invocation of the 
doctrine of equitable excuse, the Court in Diesdorf cited a 
Texas case froit^  the Texas Civil Court of Appeals called Cattle 
Feeders. Cattlle Feeders, your Honor, is one of many, many 
cases around tl^ e country in which courts have repeatedly held 
that the doctrine of equitable excuse arises exactly in the 
situations (inaudible). 
Your Honor, we're not talking about a case — a stray 
case from New Hampshire and we're not talking about a stray 
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1 case from Hawaii, we're talking about a doctrine that's been 
2 recognized all over the courts on contracts. "The power of the 
3 holder of an option to buy or renew contained in a lease is not 
4 necessarily terminated by failure to give notice within the 
5 specified time. If in expectation of exercising the power the 
6 lessee has made valuable improvements, and the delay is short 
7 without any change of position by the lessor, the lessee will 
8 be given specific performance of the contract to sell or renew. 
9 This is for the purpose of avoiding inequitable forfeiture." 
10 That's Corbin. 
11 If that is not sweeping enough, your Honor, we've 
12 cited the Court to the ALR annotation, 1997, that Mr. Johnson 
13 briefly referred to in which the commentator there summarizing 
14 cases over the last 30 years all over the country said — and 
15 this is his summary, "It appears that all courts which have 
16 dealt with the issue in recent years have recognized that there 
17 can be special circumstances which may warrant equitable relief 
18 from a lessee's failure or delay in giving notice of an option 
19 in its lease. Most of the cases on an excuse of a late notice 
20 for exercising renewal option have involved commercial leases 
21 in which successful claims of hardship have included factors 
22 such as initial investment, improvements, good will at a 
23 particular location, potential loss of existing business and 
24 the costs of moving to a new location." 
25 The point that the commentator makes in reviewing all 
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1 of these casejs is the Court ought not close its eyes to the 
2 normal thingsl that humans would find important in a situation 
3 like this, lifce the making of improvements, like the 
4 accumulation 6f good will at a particular location. You just 
5 can't shut yoiir eyes, according to these commentators, to those 
6 particular types of facts. 
7 In f^ct, your Honor, what we have tried to do in our 
8 brief to the (Jourt is to collect together the factors that have 
9 been examined by most of the courts applying the doctrine of 
10 equitable excu|se. You see in a little kind of footnote thing 
11 on this overhead I've got just some of the cases that have 
12 recognized the$e factors. This is not an exclusive list. I 
13 think if you l^ ok at the ALR annotation to see that some courts 
14 have focused oili (inaudible) some have focused on other factors. 
15 All these are i^ ot always present, but they are all present 
16 here, is what I need to say. 
17 The fi[rst issue is was the failure to give notice 
18 inadvertent, triat is did it result from an honest and 
19 justifiable mistake rather than a willful or gross negligence? 
20 The word "justijfiable" is — I mean I guess Mr. Johnson would 
21 like us to have a mistake that was not really a mistake. I 
22 mean a mistake is a mistake. It was an inadvertence. Are 
23 there some reasons that justified the mistake? Sure, there are 
24 here. 
25 There yere other things on these people's minds, they 
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1 were deeply involved in these negotiations in Park City, they 
2 had a two year old daughter that was having some issues at 
3 home, there was a valued employee that left, there were things 
4 that distracted them and caused this inadvertent error, but I 
5 don't think it can be said that it wasn't honest and 
6 justifiable mistake because the opposite, the dichotomy here, 
7 is with willfulness or gross negligence. 
8 The second factor that the courts look at is did the 
9 lessee unduly delay giving notice once the mistake was 
10 discovered. I guess item No. 2-A is the most obvious thing, 
11 was the delay brief. Here it was 11 days. Did the lessee 
12 unduly delay giving notice once the mistake was discovered. 
13 Number three is did the lessor as a result of the 
14 lessee's failure to give timely notice change its position and 
15 therefore suffer prejudice. Was the lease as extended for a 
16 long term not a short term. We're dealing here with a lease of 
17 20 years potentially and at least five years, not a lease for a 
18 period of months. Finally, would and if inequitable forfeiture 
19 result if equity should not intervene, that is have permanent 
20 improvements been made on the premises by the lessee with the 
21 intention of exercising its options to remain on the premises. 
22 Your Honor, to summarize our position on these 
23 factors, first of all my clients delay in giving notice was an 
24 honest and justifiable mistake. It was a mistake. Kathy 
25 Sturgis made an error. She should have realized it, but she 
1103 
-34-
1 didn't. Number two, the delay in giving the notice was slight, 
2 11 days. Whi[te Pine provided notice on the day it discovered 
3 the oversight). 
4 Diesidorf is an interesting case, your Honor, because 
5 the delay thete was a period of months, and the delay was after 
6 the initial l^ase term had ended. I mean the notice was given 
7 months after the lease term had ended. But this was July 21, 
8 this was a moifith and 10 days before the lease term had even 
9 ended. It was a slight delay. In fact, your Honor, if you 
10 read the case$ I don't think you will find a case that has a 
11 shorter delay. Most of the cases that we deal with are delays 
12 of two or three months. 
13 But tjhat leads to the next issue prejudice, Utah Coal 
14 and Lumber wasi not prejudiced by White Pine's delay in giving 
15 notice. The i^sue here is not — I mean we believe that they 
16 could probably rent this space for more than our lease entitles 
17 us to pay, so they're losing some money. That's not the kind 
18 of prejudice ttyat the law recognizes. What the law recognizes 
19 is did the del^y itself result in a change of position such 
20 that the exercise of equity in this case would case substantial 
21 prejudice to Utah Coal and Lumber, and as I indicated earlier, 
22 they've not come forth with anything. We've asked the 
23 question, we've gotten no for an answer. 
24 Number four, both parties anticipated that the lease 
25 would be extended for a total 20 year term, no question about 
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1 I that. The parties believed that Utah Coal and Lumber were in 
2 it for the long term, that was their expectation. 
3 Finally, White Pine, the Sturgises, Charlie and Kathy 
4 will suffer substantial and irreparable harm if the delay is 
5 not equitably excused. Their investment in the property will 
6 be gone, and it will enure to the benefit of the Powells. They 
7 will be able to lease an attractive retail space to somebody 
8 else precisely because the Sturgises made a long-term 
9 investment of their life savings. 
10 So we believe that we're entitled to summary judgment, 
11 your Honor. We don't think that there are any disputed issues 
12 of material fact. If the Court reads the papers — I'm sorry 
13 for the volume of this stuff that we've presented to the Court. 
14 This is an important issue for the Sturgises, you need to 
15 understand that, so we put it all in kind of excruciating 
16 volume to the Court. But if the Court compares what we say are 
17 undisputed issues of material fact with their responses, I 
18 think the Court will conclude, as I have, that if there are 
19 some disputes they don't really relate to the matters that are 
20 material in relation to our motion. 
21 Your Honor, I have to say this as well. If the Court 
22 is not inclined to grant summary judgment in favor of White 
23 Pine Touring we believe that the Court should not grant summary 
24 judgment for Utah Coal and Lumber, and there are really two 
25 reasons why I say that. One of them is that we believe that 
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the Sturgise^/White Pine Touring have raised a serious 
argument, both factually and legally, in support of the 
doctrine of equitable excuse. 
We believe that the Court should grant summary 
judgment, but if the Court does not grant summary judgment, at 
least we are Entitled to go to trial on the issues relating to 
equitable excuse, and for that reason we would ask the Court 
not to grant iuramary judgment on behalf of Utah Coal and 
Lumber. 
We allso believe, your Honor, and this is the second 
point, that tfyere is a very significant factual issue that 
would have to be tried if the Court doesn't grant summary 
judgment for ujs on the issue of the plaintiff's damages. The 
Court may remefrber from the papers that there was an initial 
affidavit of a person named Ty Loyola who is in fact a neighbor 
and a lessee of another property that the Powells own, that he 
would be willing to rent a portion of the— 
THE CpURT: But not the entire thing. 
MR. SULLIVAN: —the Utah Coal and Lumber building for 
$22.50 a square foot, which is double what our folks are paying 
right now undetf the current lease, and then I pointed out in 
our response memorandum that that's not good enough, that for a 
whole host of reasons that is not proof of damage, and that is 
not proof of fair rental value. Mr. Loyola came back with a 
second affidavit in which he said what he really meant to say 
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1 is that he would rent the whole thing for $22.50 a square foot 
2 average. 
3 Well, we presented — first of all, what we have are 
4 two contradictory affidavits on which we would be entitled to 
5 present some evidence, on which we would be entitled to do some 
6 discovery. I filed a Rule 56 affidavit, the purpose of which 
7 basically is to say we ought to do discovery on that issue 
8 if — before it goes to trial, and there should not be summary 
9 judgment on that issue. 
10 But beyond that we don't believe, your Honor, that the 
11 presentation of a non-binding proposal by one person amounts to 
12 proof of fair rental — fair market rental, and we presented on 
13 page 11 of our reply brief some authorities to that effect, and 
14 we think that those authorities are dispositive. 
15 In conclusion, your Honor, we ask the Court not to 
16 shut its eyes to the facts. We ask the Court to exercise all 
17 of its equitable powers here because it's the fair and it's the 
18 right thing to do. There is an enormous amount of law 
19 throughout the country to support the doctrine of equitable 
20 excuse as we've framed it in this case. The facts of this case 
21 and particularly the undisputed evidence relating to the 
22 Sturgises very significant expenditures for permanent 
23 improvements present the most compelling type of case for 
24 equitable excuse. 
25 We ask the Court again to exercise what we believe is 
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its unquestioned power to do equity in this case, to excuse 
this very bri£f delay, to declare the right of White Pine 
Touring to a Second five-year term subject to the provisions of 
the lease for rent escalation, and to grant summary judgment 
for White Pin3 Touring. Thank you, your Honor. 
THE GOURT: Mr. Johnson? 
MR. JIOHNSON: Thank you, your Honor. Your Honor, as 
Mr. Sullivan afcly pointed out, the Sturgises spent money 
renovating the property, changing it from a restaurant to a 
retail facility. That issue really is not — it's not disputed 
nor is it relevant. The situation that we have here is that 
they wanted to move into a building that was a restaurant and 
turn it into a retail establishment. They determined that they 
would have to Spend in excess of $75,000 to make that 
renovation. Tliey spent, they allege, $105,000. So the 
$105,000 is not the number that's even important, and the 
question is the| difference they spent between $75,000 and 
$105,000, is th£t a substantial investment to which they are 
not entitled to receive anything. 
As Mr. Sullivan pointed out they have pending claims 
for breach of contract and claims for unjust enrichment. If 
the Court determines that they have not strictly complied with 
the option provision and they're not entitled to equitable 
excusal, they still have claims for unjust enrichment, and they 
might prevail on those, but they might not. So they're not 
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1 without remedy. 
2 Utah Coal and Lumber, however, is without remedy. 
3 Their only option here is the terms of the contract. They 
4 entered into a contract, and if you read that contract you will 
5 see that there is absolutely no way Utah Coal and Lumber can 
6 ever get out of that. 
7 White Pine had an option, White Pine did not exercise 
8 the option, and White Pine is asking your Honor to make a 
9 determination that because of these other circumstances it's 
10 not fair to make them exercise that option. 
11 Your Honor, the case law in Utah is somewhat more 
12 strict than the case law in other jurisdictions. ALR 
13 definitely cites a lot of cases, and ALR says that courts 
14 consider that. But the two Utah cases are pretty strict, IXL 
15 and Diesdorf. IXL is cited in the ALR under the section that 
16 says, "Equity not available." 
17 There is not a body of law in Utah that goes through 
18 an analysis consistent with what Professor Corbin writes. That 
19 may or may not be equitable, but it's not the law in Utah. The 
20 Supreme Court in 1907 and 1998 reiterates the state of the law 
21 in Utah. 
22 The case in IXL, the Supreme Court said, "The case 
23 (inaudible) belongs to that class of cases where the contract 
24 expires absolutely and a new term must be granted by the same 
25 formalities as was the old." They didn't exercise their 
-40-
1 option, there; is no more contract, and the Court said, "No 
2 forfeiture is involved. Appellant at most lost nothing but an 
3 opportunity by not performing a condition required of it which 
4 was necessary to the enjoyment of a right to an additional term 
5 and which was to be paid for when obtained." 
6 White Pine would like your Honor to believe that this 
7 is a case whetfe they will be devastated if they lose. That has 
8 not been established. They have made their allegation that 
9 they will go out of business, and there's nothing, obviously, 
10 that we can dq to controvert that, but it's speculative at 
11 best. 
12 They say, "We expected to be in there for 20 years," 
13 and that's why they took a copy of the lease. "Our delay was 
14 late, it was slight, 11 days." Well, the response, the 
15 exercise of th£ option was in response to our letter, which by 
16 the way, was s^ nt to the post office box set forth in the lease 
17 itself, whereir^  they said, "Now we're going to cure this, we 
18 have a right tc^> cure," which is a mistake in law. They said, 
19 "Oh, well, we'ihe doing it now." 
20 The situation we have here is that if you have a lease 
21 or a contract Option that is so valuable, whose responsibility 
22 is it to make sure that you abide by the terms of that lease or 
23 that contract? It is not Utah Coal and Lumber's responsibility 
24 to tell them to exercise their option. 
25 Now they had a 60-day window, and they say, "Well, you 
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1 know, it might have been somewhat ambiguous as to when the 
2 lease started because of that commencement date language," but 
3 it's not ambiguous that they had been in there for five years, 
4 and it's not ambiguous that they had a 60-day window. This 
5 isn't a situation where they mailed notice two days early or 
6 two days late based upon the alleged ambiguity. This is a 
7 situation where during that window they did not do anything, 
8 and the only notice they gave was in response to our notice 
9 that they hadn't exercised their option and so we're moving on. 
10 Now Mr. Sullivan indicates that he doesn't think that 
11 any case has such a slight delay that finds against the lessee. 
12 However, in ALR in Western Savings Fund vs. Southeast 
13 Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, a 1981 case from 
14 Pennsylvania, the Court concluded that, "The equitable 
15 considerations were compelling against a commercial lessee, 
16 which was a few days late in giving a 90 days notice for 
17 renewal where the sole reason for the tardy notice was 
18 attributed to administrative oversight resulting from a very 
19 heavy workload, occasioned by the fact that the lessee was 
20 engaged in a mass branch expansion program at the time of 
21 exercising its option to renew." That Court went on to say 
22 that, "A heavy workload is not only foreseen by commercial 
23 entities, but it's also a state of affairs which businesses 
24 strive to achieve." 
25 In this case the Sturgises indicate that other 
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1 pressing matters, they had other business matters going on that 
2 prevented theft from remembering to exercise their option- It 
3 was not anybody's responsibility except the Sturgises to remind 
4 themselves of their obligations under the contract. 
5 The ]EXL case from Utah is cited in this section where 
6 it says, "Equity may not be arbitrarily exercised to alter the 
7 terms of a contract in order to relieve an unfortunate 
8 situation caused solely by the negligent failure of the party 
9 seeking relief to observe its requirements." 
10 The Utah cases are consistent in the finding that 
11 property rights that are contracted away or for must be 
12 strictly obsertved. The Court did not set forth the test that 
13 is urged by White Pine. The Court did not say equity will 
14 always apply. The Court said there are situations where equity 
15 may apply. 
16 The issue of whether or not the Sturgises were model 
17 tenants is not before the Court today, it is not disputed, but 
18 it doesn't hav^ anything to do with the basic legal question 
19 here. One, do0s equitable excusal apply in Utah, if so to what 
20 extent, and tw0, was the Sturgises failure to exercise their 
21 option due to ttheir own forgetfulness or inadvertence an 
22 excusable or ari honest and justifiable mistake. 
23 They have talked about their livelihood, but what they 
24 haven't mentioned to the Court is that it's undisputed that Ms. 
25 Sturgis had the lease hold interest valued at $750,000 to them, 
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1 and that she indicated that it was more fair that they were 
2 entitled to that $750,000 than Utah Coal and Lumber, the owner 
3 of the property. 
4 It was anticipated by both parties that the Sturgises 
5 would exercise their option. The language used by Mr. Powell 
6 in his deposition was that he would be extremely surprised if 
7 they didn't exercise their option because it was a really, 
8 really, really good deal for them. They were paying $11 a 
9 square foot, and the market value as we allege is $22 a square 
10 foot, so that's a really good deal. The rent increase was 
11 based upon a consumer price index calculation, so it wasn't 
12 going to go up consistent with market values, it was going to 
13 go up way smaller than that. 
14 So the anticipation that they would exercise that 
15 option is not an exercise of an option, and that's what the 
16 Diesdorf vs. Dody case specifically says, that under such 
17 circumstances the plaintiff is obliged to take reasonable steps 
18 to inform himself and to protect his own interests. 
19 He maintains that after the signing they never 
20 requested him to exercise his option and that the jury could 
21 infer that everybody intended him to exercise his option, but 
22 his belief of what Dody should have known does not distinctly 
23 indicate whether she intended to waive written notice. His 
24 assumed knowledge of her intent does not exercise that option. 
25 For that proposition Diesdorf cites the IXL furniture case. A 
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1 mere intention to exercise your option is not an exercise of 
2 the option. 
3 They were told by their lawyer that the default clause 
4 would save thlem, give them a chance to cure. Mr. Sullivan 
5 indicated thaft that's undisputed, but it's also irrelevant 
6 because a mistake in law not caused by Utah Coal and Lumber 
7 cannot be a bfcsis for equitable excuse, and that truly is a 
8 mistake in law. 
9 The JL1 day delay, what harm has occurred? Well, we 
10 don't have to show any harm. Utah Coal and Lumber owns the 
11 property. White Pine had an option to renew their lease that 
12 they didn't exercise. It's interesting to note that if White 
13 Pine had exercised its option Utah Coal and Lumber was 
14 obligated by tjhe contract to accept that and to enter into an 
15 additional five-year term based upon the lease provisions that 
16 would raise th£ rent according to the consumer price index. 
17 There is nothing in the lease that required White Pine 
18 to exercise itjs option. They could have just picked up and 
19 moved. So theire is nothing that would require them to stay, 
20 but it certainly required Utah Coal and Lumber to accept them 
21 to stay. And 1|:hey say, "Well, everybody knew we wanted to 
22 stay," but thai just doesn't create a mutual contract. This is 
23 clearly a unilateral contract, an option to renew that must be 
24 strictly complied with. 
25 Your flonor, White Pine would ask you to make a 
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determination, an expanse ruling, an expansive body of law to 
say that equitable excuse exists in Utah, and to the extent 
that it exists it goes beyond the language of the Diesdorf vs. 
Dody, and the reason that that's so important is that that case 
is from 1998 and deals specifically with these questions. But 
it goes beyond what they say, which is that it's a result of an 
honest and justifiable mistake. 
If the Court makes a determination that in Utah there 
is equitable excuse, it's not an expansive equitable excuse. 
Your Honor should not read into or create new law based upon 
White Pine's argument that it's more fair because of all of 
these other cases. Honest and justifiable mistake is a term of 
art. Mere forgetfulness is not an honest and justifiable 
mistake, and that's what these ALR cases say. Everyone of them 
says sheer forgetfulness is not equitable excuse. 
The Nevada case in 1978, Host International, the Court 
stated that, "Equity would not intervene to protect a lessee 
who admitted that timely exercise of an option by written 
notice was simply overlooked." That's what we have here, and 
your Honor should make a determination that mere forgetfulness, 
mere oversight, inadvertence and neglect through no fault of 
Utah Coal and Lumber does not give White Pine a basis for 
equitable relief. 
As I said before, equity aids the vigilant, and if 
they intended to protect what investment they had made, they 
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1 should have made provisions to provide that notice. It was 
2 hardly an oneirous provision. It didn't require them to do 
3 anything more than to send a note. They did nothing until Utah 
4 Coal and Lumber informed them that the lease would expire on 
5 its terms. 
6 Now your Honor, we have asked for summary judgment 
7 that the Court make a determination that there is no basis for 
8 which White Pine can remain in the property. They have not 
9 exercised their option through strict compliance. Mr. Sullivan 
10 concedes that there's no waiver, there's no exigent 
11 circumstances. We would ask your Honor to make a finding that 
12 mere forgetfu3Jness, mere "I overlooked it," or "I forgot," or 
13 "I missed it," does not constitute an honest and justifiable 
14 mistake. We would ask your Honor to find in our favor on 
15 summary judgment. 
16 Now Mf- Sullivan indicates that those issues should be 
17 tried before t|ie Court on the equitable excuse and the trial on 
18 the issues of What does and does not constitute equitable 
19 excuse. But as I earlier indicated, the Court in Reynolds in 
20 Texas said equitable excuse, honest and justifiable mistake is 
21 a question of law for this Court to decide. 
22 I wou^d urge your Honor to make a finding that her 
23 failure to exercise the option was not due to an honest and 
24 justifiable mistake. It was because of forgetfulness, and that 
25 equity is not going to save her from her forgetfulness. 
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1 As for the damages, your Honor, it's interesting to 
2 note that Mr. Loyola's first letter said, "I want the west 
3 end," and we put that affidavit in, and Mr. Sullivan indicated 
4 in their reply that that was a specific portion. So we went 
5 back to Mr. Loyola so that he could clarify that his intent and 
6 his desire is to lease the entire building, and it included the 
7 word, "average." The reason for that is because you have 
8 upstairs space and downstairs space, and the average rent that 
9 he is willing to pay for that property is $22 a square foot. 
10 Now the rent is — excuse me, Mr. Sullivan would like 
11 to have discovery on that issue. Mr. Sullivan had ample 
12 opportunity for discovery on that issue. In our complaint we 
13 said the market value is $22 a square foot. We have maintained 
14 that throughout the entire proceedings. Mr. Sullivan has not 
15 done discovery on the issue of the $22 a square foot. If he 
16 had an expert witness who would say that property is not worth 
17 $22 a square foot it was not presented. 
18 Mr. Loyola, his intent is to rent the property. It is 
19 not up to White Pine to make a determination of what is the 
20 best use of Utah Coal and Lumber's property. The issue that we 
21 have here is that in its current state what is the market 
22 value, and for that we have Mr. Loyola's affidavit. Mr. Loyola 
23 was identified early on by Mr. Powell in his deposition, and 
24 White Pine decided not to do anything as far as discovery and 
25 should not be allowed to now go back and try to redo all of the 
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issues. The market value is $22 a square foot. They've put 
nothing in to controvert that. 
The two affidavits, I believe if you review them, your 
Honor, are noft contradictory. The second affidavit is a 
clarification of the first to indicate that his desire is to 
lease the entire building, only because White Pine raised the 
issue that perhaps his intent was only to lease part of it. So 
his second affidavit was merely clarification, certainly not 
contradictory• 
Now tye have also asked for alternative relief. In the 
event that your Honor makes a determination that the issue on 
damages has too many contested facts in order to grant siimmary 
judgment, it'0 undisputed that there has been no rent paid 
since last September, and that the rent obligation — the lease 
pursuant to ttye terms of the former lease is at $11 per square 
foot, or $4,000 and some dollars per month in rent. 
There is a $60,000 possession bond, and what we ask 
your Honor to do is to make a determination that it is 
undisputed that they owe at least that much, and therefore 
grant an award of an amount equal to the rents accrued during 
that time period, and that specifically sets forth the amounts 
in our memorandum decision. 
That is merely an alternative argument and it's not a 
concession in iny way. It appears that your Honor can easily 
grant the damages based upon the evidence before it. We would 
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1 ask your Honor to make a determination that they have not 
2 exercised their option, that the option has expired, and that 
3 Utah Coal and Lumber is entitled to damages. 
4 MR. SULLIVAN: Your Honor, may I say one word? 
5 THE COURT: Yes. 
6 MR. SULLIVAN: Mr. Johnson's — I need to advise the 
7 Court that we've made a continuing tender of the rent. We 
8 tried to actually send a check for the month of September and 
9 we have made a continuing payment, which was rejected by 
10 (inaudible). I also want to indicate, since Mr. Johnson 
11 mentioned the word ambiguous in connection with the contract 
12 that the lease itself was drafted — there's no question about 
13 this — by counsel for Utah Coal and Lumber. 
14 Mr. Johnson also said that the Court has to decide 
15 this question as a matter of law, that is honest and 
16 justifiable mistake. We think that the Court should decide 
17 that in our favor. The Court doesn't have to. The Court can 
18 have a trial on equity issues, and that's exactly what a number 
19 of courts have done is to determine whether a particular 
20 mistake or inadvertence was honest and justifiable. Thank you. 
21 THE COURT: Counsel, let me start off by saying it's 
22 been a very long time since I have had such able oral argument 
23 on both sides. Maybe I have gotten complacent, but I 
24 appreciate the quality of the argument you've given. It rises 
25 well above what I have gotten used to. I don't know if that's 
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a comment on your abilities or a comment on the practice in 
general, but I appreciate what you've done. 
I'm going to find that strict compliance is the 
general rule in Utah for interpretation of factual provisions 
dealing with options to renew. I'm going to find that as a 
matter of Utalji law equitable excuse is available as an 
exception to "the written requirement of strict compliance. 
I'm going to find further that mere mistake and 
forgetfulness is insufficient as a matter of law to set the 
stage for inequitable excuse. I'm going to find that the 30 
day grace provision that was mentioned is not sufficient by 
itself, but it does set the contextual background to having 
made the fact that the mistake may have been honest. 
I'11 hote for the record that upon receipt of notice 
of the expiration of the term the defendant's response was 
immediate, that there was a short delay of 11 days. I'll note 
for the record that there was no prejudice from that 11 day 
delay, that th£re was not a change of position, there was no 
effort expended to sell or lease the property during that time 
period, there was not a change of position. 
I'm going to note that the mistake in the Utah case 
deals with illuminating what honest and justifiable is by a 
juxtaposition with willful and gross negligence. I'm going to 
find that in th^ at juxtaposition this case is certainly not one 
of willful or gross negligence. It's my belief that it was an 
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honest mistake. The question centers around on whether or not 
it's justifiable. 
The context of the distractions that the defendants 
were absorbed with at the time, I think, again, sets the 
context for finding it was an honest mistake. I don't think 
parties to a contract are responsible for the personal concerns 
of other parties to the contract, but I think it does again set 
up the fact that it was an honest mistake. 
I'm going to find that the defendants would suffer 
substantial and irreparable harm if the delay were not excused. 
I'm going to grant summary judgment for the defendants finding 
that the equitable excuse requirements have been met. I think 
there was an honest and justifiable mistake of a very short 
duration during which no change of position occurred, that the 
loss would be substantial, and that it was not simply a mere 
mistake but one accompanied by a lack of change of position, a 
loss and an honest mistake, and I will grant summary judgment 
on that basis for the defendant finding that the lease term was 
renewed with the notice received on the 11th day after the 
expiration of the contractual time period for renewal. 
Counsel, I assume that this is something you're going 
to want to take up. It's certainly something that I would 
expect the appeals court and the Supreme Court will want to 
weigh in and give some definitive advice. It's certainly not 
the first time they will either affirm or overturn me, but is 
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1 there something you want me to address for the record so that 
2 it's clear ai>d that they have it in context when it is 
3 reviewed. 
4 MR. JOHNSON: Yes, your Honor. You made a finding 
5 that mere mistake and forgetfulness would be insufficient for 
6 equitable excjuse, and then you made a finding below that the — 
7 your finding there was an honest mistake, but you had an open 
8 ended question as to whether or not it was justifiable, so I'd 
9 ask that you make findings on that. 
10 THE COURT: I'm going to find that because there is no 
11 change in position, because there is a substantial loss, 
12 because the mistake is honest, and the term "justifiable" 
13 simply means whether or not the Court accepts that as 
14 sufficient, atid I'm going to find that in this situation in 
15 this factual setting that this mistake is honest and 
16 justifiable. 
17 MR. JOHNSON: Your Honor, one more issue then would be 
18 on that basis what do we do with the claim for the damages on 
19 rent? We've got a possession bond, the two amounts are almost 
20 equal. Do yoti want to make a ruling on the release of the 
21 possession bohd? 
22 THE (tOURT: I guess the question is if you appeal the 
23 ruling whether or not the possession bond is something that 
24 you're going to want to maintain. 
25 Mr. Sullivan? 
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MR. SULLIVAN: I think we can probably live with that, 
your Honor. We know that we owe the rent. It is now 
determinable what the rent is for that period of time 
(inaudible) 1998 to present. We will pay the rent. 
MR. JOHNSON: That's satisfactory. 
THE COURT: Okay. Anything else, Mr. Johnson, that 
you want me to address to try to make sure the record is 
complete? 
While you're looking at that, Mr. Sullivan, anything 
that you want to address so that the record is complete? 
MR. SULLIVAN: I don't think so, your Honor, I think 
your findings have been (inaudible). 
MR. JOHNSON: Your Honor, could you expand on your 
finding of suffer substantial harm on the defendants? 
THE COURT: That's on the basis of the decision to 
invest between $75,000 and $100,000 in a business with the 
expectation of a 20 year right to stay, clearly that was 
continued on giving notice on substantial rent increases during 
that time period, the loss of that investment as well as the 
expectation of them staying in one location for 20 years, such 
as your customer base and clientele understand where you are 
and where they can find you, the other steps that come with 
that are all factored into that question of harm the equitable 
excuse is not found to extend the lease. 
MR. JOHNSON: Did your Honor make any finding that the 
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failure to exercise the option was more than forgetfulness, was 
caused by more than forgetfulness? 
THE COURT: I don't think it's relevant the question 
of whether it's more than just forgetfulness, assuming for the 
purpose of granting this motion that it was simply 
forgetfulness^ and that one party is not responsible for the 
personal concerns of another, that that's each parties' own 
lookout for themselves. 
MR. $ULLIVAN: And you're making no finding that Utah 
Coal and Lumber took any action to cause them to— 
THE QOURT: No, there is no suggestion that I've seen 
in the record that Utah Coal is responsible for their lack of 
giving that notice. 
MR. JpHNSON: Thank you. 
THE CPURT: Mr. Sullivan? 
MR. SULLIVAN: Your Honor, perhaps there is something 
that the Court would want to address now, or we may have some 
briefing on it later, and that is that under the lease there is 
a prevailing p^rty attorney fee award provision. We have pled 
and we believe that we ought to be entitled to award of all of 
our costs, but also our attorney's fees and costs. We could 
present that tc> the Court in argument (inaudible) judgment 
(inaudible). 




THE COURT: I'm not going to award the attorney's fees 
now. If you want to make that request and submission and give 
Mr. Johnson a chance to respond. 
MR. SULLIVAN: Very good. 
THE COURT: I guess I have a big question in my mind 
about whether or not the equitable extension of a contract 
brings into being the right for attorney's fees under that 
contract. To reach outside the contract to do something and 
then use a contractual provision to provide for attorney's 
fees, I guess, is an open question in my mind. 
MR. SULLIVAN: Okay, let us present some authority to 
the Court. 
THE COURT: Mr. Sullivan, I'm going to ask you to 
draft the findings and ruling and submit that to Mr. Johnson 
for approval as to form. 
MR. SULLIVAN: I will. Thank you, your Honor. 
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PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 
CERTIFY PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT UNDER RULE 54(b) 
Civil No. 980600256 
Judge: Hon. William A. Thorne 
Plaintiffs Motion to Certify as final pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ut. R. Civ. P., this 
Court's Partial Summary Judgment dated August 6, and filed August 9, 1999, came on for 
hearing on March 30, 2000, the Honorable William A. Thorne presiding. Plaintiff was 
represented by Janet A. Goldstein, Attorney at Law; Defendant was represented by Todd 
M. Shaughnessy and Alan L. Sullivan of SNELL & WILMER, L.L.P.. The Court, 
having considered the memoranda submitted and the oral argument of counsel, finds as 
follows: 
afinir c c C DAIH: 0^-7 09415 
1. The Court finds that the key issue in this case is the issue of whether or not the 
Defendant exercise^ the option to renew the lease between the parties dated May 
16, 1993. Resolution of this issue depends on whether or not the doctrine of 
equitable excuse is available under Utah law and, if so, whether equitable excuse 
was available in this case to avoid the necessity of strict compliance with the 
provision in the lea$e concerning Defendant's option to renew. 
2. The Partial Summary Judgment decided the lease renewal/equitable excuse issue in 
this matter in favor pf Defendant and concluded that Defendant would be deemed 
to have exercised its option to renew for a five-year period. 
3. The law regarding equitable excuse in relation to strict compliance with the 
requirements of a lease renewal option is not settled in Utah, such that the issue as 
presented in this ca^e should be brought before the appellate court for further 
consideration and definition. 
4. The Court finds that the adjudication of the lease renewal/equitable excuse issue 
would not support any type of res judicata effect as to the remaining claims in this 
action, and a decision on such remaining claims would not moot the issues being 
certified for appeal. 
5. The Court finds that {he issue to be appealed and the remaining claims may have 
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some common factual context, in that they relate to the lease; however, the facts are 
not so tied together or intertwined that a decision on the lease renewal/equitable 
excuse issue decides the questions of fact pertaining to Defendant's remaining 
claims. The remaining claims involve breach of contract, negligence and related 
claims, based on entirely separate and unrelated provisions of the lease. 
6. Accordingly the Court finds that there is not a significant overlap of facts and that 
the lease renewal/equitable excuse issue is separate from the issues remaining to be 
litigated in this matter. 
7. The Court finds that an appellate resolution of the lease renewal/equitable excuse 
issue will supply direction and guidance which will in turn enable this Court to 
clarify and simplify the litigation of any remaining claims in this matter. 
Regardless of the outcome of an appeal, one or more of the remaining claims will 
be eliminated, such that certification of the Partial Summary Judgment for appeal 
promotes judicial economy in this matter. 
8. Therefore, the Court finds that there is no just reason for delaying appellate review 
of the lease renewal/equitable excuse issue. 
Based on the foregoing findings, the Court concludes that 
1. The Partial Summary Judgment is final within the meaning of Rule 54(b), Ut. R. 
i 
Civ. P., and satisfies the requirements associated with that rule. 
2. Certification of the Partial Summary Judgment as final pursuant to Rule 54(b) will 
simplify the litigation of the remaining claims and will not interfere with the 
consideration of any valid remaining claims. 
3. There is no just reason for delay of the appeal. 
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion to Certify Partial 
Summary Judgment under Rule 54(b) is granted. 
Dated this day of April, 2000. 
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Approved as to form: 
Janet A. Goldstein 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Approved as to form: 
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Todd M. Shaughnessy 
Alan L. Sullivan 
Attorneys for Defendant 
isnro 
gftni/ r rr •*•**-
O Q ^ 
